/usr/lib/ocaml/netsys/netsys_tls.mli is in libocamlnet-ocaml-dev 4.1.2-3.
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(** User-level TLS API *)
open Netsys_types
(** The following functions are a very thin layer on top of
{!Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_PROVIDER}. The provider is passed
here as first-class value together with the configuration and
with the endpoint (socket). In particular, we have
{[
module type FILE_TLS_ENDPOINT =
sig
module TLS : TLS_PROVIDER
val endpoint : TLS.endpoint
val rd_file : Unix.file_descr
val wr_file : Unix.file_descr
end
]}
(see {!Netsys_crypto_types}). In many cases, you can consider the
packed modules as opaque values. Sometimes, however, it is
useful to call functions of the provider directly. You can do this
as follows, demonstrated by calling the provider function
[get_peer_crt_list] for [endpoint]:
{[
let module Endpoint =
(val endpoint : Netsys_crypto_types.FILE_TLS_ENDPOINT) in
let certificates =
Endpoint.TLS.get_peer_crt_list Endpoint.endpoint
]}
If you do this, be aware that the inner types of the
provider are meaningless outside, and you get a compiler error
"type ... would escape its scope" if you try to export such typed
values. Exceptions thrown by the provider should be caught and
translated to [Error] with {!Netsys_tls.translate_exn}.
*)
type dh_params =
[ `PKCS3_PEM_file of string
| `PKCS3_DER of string
| `Generate of int
]
(** Diffie-Hellman parameters:
- [`PKCS3_PEM_file name]: points to a PEM-encoded PKCS3-file
("BEGIN DH PARAMETERS")
- [`PKCS3_DER data]: the parameters are in a DER-encoded PKCS3
structure
- [`Generate bits]: the parameters are generated with the
passed number of bits
*)
type crt_list =
[`PEM_file of string | `DER of string list]
(** Certificates are given either as:
- [`PEM_file name]: The certs are stored in this file, and are
PEM-encoded.
- [`DER l]: The certs are given directly in their DER-encoded form
See also {!Credentials.tls}.
*)
type crl_list =
[`PEM_file of string | `DER of string list]
(** Certificate revocation lists are given either as:
- [`PEM_file name]: The CRLs are stored in this file, and are
PEM-encoded.
- [`DER l]: The CRLs are given directly in their DER-encoded form
See also {!Credentials.tls}.
*)
type private_key =
[ `PEM_file of string
| `RSA of string
| `DSA of string
| `EC of string
| `PKCS8 of string
| `PKCS8_encrypted of string
]
(** Private keys are given either as:
- [`PEM_file name]: The key is stored PEM-encoded in this file.
The PEM header indicates the format.
- [`RSA data]: The key is a PKCS1 RSA key
- [`DSA data]: The key is a DSA key
- [`EC data]: The key is for an elliptic curve
- [`PKCS8 data]: The key is in a PKCS8 data structure
- [`PKCS8_encrypted data]: The key is in a PKCS8 data structure,
and is additionally encrypted.
See also {!Credentials.tls}.
*)
val error_message : (module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_PROVIDER) ->
string -> string
(** Returns the message for humans (display, log files etc.) when
called with an error or warning symbol.
*)
val create_x509_config :
?algorithms : string ->
?dh_params : dh_params ->
?verify : ((module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) ->
bool -> bool -> bool) ->
?system_trust:bool ->
?trust : crt_list list ->
?revoke : crl_list list ->
?keys : (crt_list * private_key * string option) list ->
peer_auth : [ `None | `Optional | `Required ] ->
(module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_PROVIDER) ->
(module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_CONFIG)
(** The configuration includes:
- [algorithms]: a string specifying which cryptographic algorithms,
protocols and protocol options
are enabled, and in which priority they are used in the negotiation.
(GnuTLS calls this "priority string".) The syntax is
implementation-defined.
- [dh_params]: parameters for Diffie-Hellman key exchange (used for
DH-based authentication, but only on the server side)
- [peer_auth]: controls whether the peer is requested to authenticate.
This can be set to [`None] meaning not to request authentication
and to ignore credentials, or to [`Optional] meaning not to request
authentication but to check credentials if they are sent
nevertheless, or to [`Required] meaning to request and check
credentials. For "standard clients" you should set this to
[`Required], and for "standard servers" to [`None] or
[`Required].
- [verify] is a function called to verify the peer certificate
in addition to the actions of [peer_auth]. The function must
return [true] in order to be successful. The arguments of the
function are the TLS endpoint, and two bools indicating the
success of previous checks. The first bool says whether the
certificate is trusted (based on [peer_auth], [trust] and
[system_trust]), and the second bool says whether the host name
of the peer matches the name in the certificate. If not
passed, [verify] defaults to [(fun _ cert_ok name_ok ->
cert_ok && name_ok)], i.e. both bools must be true.
- [system_trust]: if set, the system certificates are trusted
- [trust] specifies the CAs of peers to trust (default: empty)
- [revoke] specifies CRLs for revocation of peer certificates
(default: empty)
- [keys] are our own certificates, as triples
[(cert_path, private_key, password)] (default: empty)
A configuration is read-only once created, and can be used for
several endpoints. In particular, it does not cache TLS sessions.
A client should set [trust] to the list of CAs it can accept on
the server side. It is not required to specify a key.
A server must specify a key (but can also specify several keys).
If a server requests authentication from the client, it must also
set [trust].
The keys must include the full certificate path [cert_path], starting
with the endpoint certificate, followed by all middle certificates, and
ending with the certificate of the CA. The [private_key]
is the key of the endpoint. If it is password-encrypted, the
password must be given.
*)
(* TODO:
- peer_auth:`None should trust any cert of the peer
- Clients should fail if peer_auth<>`None and there is no peer_name
*)
val create_file_endpoint :
?resume:string ->
role : [ `Server | `Client ] ->
rd:Unix.file_descr ->
wr:Unix.file_descr ->
peer_name : string option ->
(module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_CONFIG) ->
(module Netsys_crypto_types.FILE_TLS_ENDPOINT)
(** [create_file_endpoint ~role ~rd ~wr ~peer_name tls_config]:
Creates a new TLS endpoint (encapsulated as module, together with
the provider) for the case that the data flows over file descriptors.
[rd] is used for reading data, and [wr] for writing (of
course, both descriptors may be identical).
[peer_name] is the expected common name or DNS name of the
peer. [peer_name] has an option type as it is not always
required to pass it. However, keep in mind that clients
normally authenticate servers ([peer_auth=`Required]). In
order to do so, they need to check whether the name in the
server certificate equals the DNS name of the service they
are connected to. This check is done by comparing [peer_name]
with the name in the certificate.
[peer_name] is also used for the SNI extension.
Servers normally need not to set [peer_name]. You can also omit it
when there is no name-driven authentication at all.
[resume]: The endpoint resumes an old session whose data are passed here.
This is only possible for client endpoints.
*)
val endpoint : (module Netsys_crypto_types.FILE_TLS_ENDPOINT) ->
(module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT)
(** Coercion *)
val handshake : (module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) -> unit
(** Procedes the TLS protocol until payload data can be exchanged.
This includes the initial handshake (if not yet done), and the
verification.
*)
val recv : ?on_rehandshake:
((module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) -> bool) ->
(module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) ->
Bytes.t -> int -> int -> int
(** [recv endpoint buffer pos len]: Receives data from [endpoint],
and puts the received bytes into [buffer] at byte position [pos].
At most [len] bytes can be received. Returns the actually received
number of bytes.
If the TLS protocol is not yet at the stage where data can be
received, the protocol is proceeded until this point (i.e.
[handshake] is "included"). Also, renegotiation alerts are interpreted.
Both phenomenons can cause that data needs to be written first.
on_rehandshake: returns whether renegotiations are allowed. Defaults to
[true]. Also, this function is guaranteed to be called when a
renegotiation request arrives. In this case, [recv] will raise
an exception such as {!Netsys_types.EAGAIN_RD} or
{!Netsys_types.EAGAIN_WR}, but never return normally.
If interrupted the function can be safely invoked again.
May raise {!Netsys_types.EAGAIN_RD}, {!Netsys_types.EAGAIN_WR},
[Unix_error(EINTR,_,_)], and [Error].
*)
val mem_recv : ?on_rehandshake:
((module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) -> bool) ->
(module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) ->
Netsys_types.memory -> int -> int -> int
(** Same for a memory-backed buffer *)
val send : (module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) ->
Bytes.t -> int -> int -> int
(** [send endpoint buffer pos len]: Sends data via [endpoint],
and takes the emitted bytes from [buffer] at byte position [pos].
At most [len] bytes can be sent. Returns the actually sent
number of bytes.
If the TLS protocol is not yet at the stage where data can be
received, the protocol is proceeded until this point (i.e.
[handshake] is "included"). Also, renegotiation alerts are interpreted.
Both phenomenons can cause that data needs to be received as well
as sent.
If interrupted the function can be safely invoked again.
May raise {!Netsys_types.EAGAIN_RD}, {!Netsys_types.EAGAIN_WR},
[Unix_error(EINTR,_,_)], and [Error].
*)
val mem_send : (module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) ->
Netsys_types.memory -> int -> int -> int
(** Same for a memory-backed buffer *)
val str_send : (module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) ->
string -> int -> int -> int
(** Same for immutable string *)
val shutdown : (module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) ->
Unix.shutdown_command -> unit
(** Ends the TLS encapsulation of data:
- [SHUTDOWN_SEND]: The payload stream is closed for sending.
- [SHUTDOWN_ALL]: The payload stream is closed for sending and
receiving.
The mode [SHUTDOWN_RECEIVE] is unsupported and silently ignored.
The function does not shut down or close the underlying file
descriptors.
If interrupted the function can be safely invoked again.
May raise {!Netsys_types.EAGAIN_RD}, {!Netsys_types.EAGAIN_WR},
[Unix_error(EINTR,_,_)], and [Error].
*)
val at_transport_eof : (module Netsys_crypto_types.TLS_ENDPOINT) -> bool
(** Whether the underlying transport channel has seen the end of
input. Use this after [recv] or [mem_recv] returned 0 to
check whether only the TLS enf-of-input message has been read,
or the underlying channel (usually the file descriptor) has
indicated EOF.
*)
module Debug : sig
val enable : bool ref
end
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