/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/Cryptodome/Signature/pkcs1_15.py is in python3-pycryptodome 3.4.7-1ubuntu1.
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#
# Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com>
# All rights reserved.
#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
#
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
# the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
# distribution.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
# "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
# LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
# CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
# ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
# ===================================================================
from Cryptodome.Util.py3compat import b, bchr
import Cryptodome.Util.number
from Cryptodome.Util.number import ceil_div, bytes_to_long, long_to_bytes
from Cryptodome.Util.asn1 import DerSequence, DerNull, DerOctetString, DerObjectId
class PKCS115_SigScheme:
"""A signature object for ``RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5``.
Do not instantiate directly.
Use :func:`Cryptodome.Signature.pkcs1_15.new`.
"""
def __init__(self, rsa_key):
"""Initialize this PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme object.
:Parameters:
rsa_key : an RSA key object
Creation of signatures is only possible if this is a *private*
RSA key. Verification of signatures is always possible.
"""
self._key = rsa_key
def can_sign(self):
"""Return ``True`` if this object can be used to sign messages."""
return self._key.has_private()
def sign(self, msg_hash):
"""Create the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature of a message.
This function is also called ``RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN`` and
it is specified in
`section 8.2.1 of RFC8017 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#page-36>`_.
:parameter msg_hash:
This is an object from the :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash` package.
It has been used to digest the message to sign.
:type msg_hash: hash object
:return: the signature encoded as a *byte string*.
:raise ValueError: if the RSA key is not long enough for the given hash algorithm.
:raise TypeError: if the RSA key has no private half.
"""
# See 8.2.1 in RFC3447
modBits = Cryptodome.Util.number.size(self._key.n)
k = ceil_div(modBits,8) # Convert from bits to bytes
# Step 1
em = _EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(msg_hash, k)
# Step 2a (OS2IP)
em_int = bytes_to_long(em)
# Step 2b (RSASP1)
m_int = self._key._decrypt(em_int)
# Step 2c (I2OSP)
signature = long_to_bytes(m_int, k)
return signature
def verify(self, msg_hash, signature):
"""Check if the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature over a message is valid.
This function is also called ``RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY`` and
it is specified in
`section 8.2.2 of RFC8037 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#page-37>`_.
:parameter msg_hash:
The hash that was carried out over the message. This is an object
belonging to the :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash` module.
:type parameter: hash object
:parameter signature:
The signature that needs to be validated.
:type signature: byte string
:raise ValueError: if the signature is not valid.
"""
# See 8.2.2 in RFC3447
modBits = Cryptodome.Util.number.size(self._key.n)
k = ceil_div(modBits, 8) # Convert from bits to bytes
# Step 1
if len(signature) != k:
raise ValueError("Invalid signature")
# Step 2a (O2SIP)
signature_int = bytes_to_long(signature)
# Step 2b (RSAVP1)
em_int = self._key._encrypt(signature_int)
# Step 2c (I2OSP)
em1 = long_to_bytes(em_int, k)
# Step 3
try:
possible_em1 = [ _EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(msg_hash, k, True) ]
# MD2/4/5 hashes always require NULL params in AlgorithmIdentifier.
# For all others, it is optional.
try:
algorithm_is_md = msg_hash.oid.startswith('1.2.840.113549.2.')
except AttributeError:
algorithm_is_md = False
if not algorithm_is_md: # MD2/MD4/MD5
possible_em1.append(_EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(msg_hash, k, False))
except ValueError:
raise ValueError("Invalid signature")
# Step 4
# By comparing the full encodings (as opposed to checking each
# of its components one at a time) we avoid attacks to the padding
# scheme like Bleichenbacher's (see http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg06537).
#
if em1 not in possible_em1:
raise ValueError("Invalid signature")
pass
def _EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(msg_hash, emLen, with_hash_parameters=True):
"""
Implement the ``EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE`` function, as defined
in PKCS#1 v2.1 (RFC3447, 9.2).
``_EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE`` actually accepts the message ``M`` as input,
and hash it internally. Here, we expect that the message has already
been hashed instead.
:Parameters:
msg_hash : hash object
The hash object that holds the digest of the message being signed.
emLen : int
The length the final encoding must have, in bytes.
with_hash_parameters : bool
If True (default), include NULL parameters for the hash
algorithm in the ``digestAlgorithm`` SEQUENCE.
:attention: the early standard (RFC2313) stated that ``DigestInfo``
had to be BER-encoded. This means that old signatures
might have length tags in indefinite form, which
is not supported in DER. Such encoding cannot be
reproduced by this function.
:Return: An ``emLen`` byte long string that encodes the hash.
"""
# First, build the ASN.1 DER object DigestInfo:
#
# DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
# digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
# digest OCTET STRING
# }
#
# where digestAlgorithm identifies the hash function and shall be an
# algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms.
#
# PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
# { OID id-md2 PARAMETERS NULL }|
# { OID id-md5 PARAMETERS NULL }|
# { OID id-sha1 PARAMETERS NULL }|
# { OID id-sha256 PARAMETERS NULL }|
# { OID id-sha384 PARAMETERS NULL }|
# { OID id-sha512 PARAMETERS NULL }
# }
#
# Appendix B.1 also says that for SHA-1/-2 algorithms, the parameters
# should be omitted. They may be present, but when they are, they shall
# have NULL value.
digestAlgo = DerSequence([ DerObjectId(msg_hash.oid).encode() ])
if with_hash_parameters:
digestAlgo.append(DerNull().encode())
digest = DerOctetString(msg_hash.digest())
digestInfo = DerSequence([
digestAlgo.encode(),
digest.encode()
]).encode()
# We need at least 11 bytes for the remaining data: 3 fixed bytes and
# at least 8 bytes of padding).
if emLen<len(digestInfo)+11:
raise TypeError("Selected hash algorith has a too long digest (%d bytes)." % len(digest))
PS = bchr(0xFF) * (emLen - len(digestInfo) - 3)
return b("\x00\x01") + PS + bchr(0x00) + digestInfo
def new(rsa_key):
"""Create a signature object for creating
or verifying PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures.
:parameter rsa_key:
The RSA key to use for signing or verifying the message.
This is a :class:`Cryptodome.PublicKey.RSA` object.
Signing is only possible when ``rsa_key`` is a **private** RSA key.
:type rsa_key: RSA object
:return: a :class:`PKCS115_SigScheme` signature object
"""
return PKCS115_SigScheme(rsa_key)
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