/usr/share/pyshared/txzookeeper/tests/test_security.py is in python-txzookeeper 0.9.5-0ubuntu1.
This file is owned by root:root, with mode 0o644.
The actual contents of the file can be viewed below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 | #
# Copyright (C) 2010-2011 Canonical Ltd. All Rights Reserved
#
# This file is part of txzookeeper.
#
# Authors:
# Kapil Thangavelu
#
# txzookeeper is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# txzookeeper is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
# along with txzookeeper. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
import hashlib
import base64
import zookeeper
from twisted.internet.defer import inlineCallbacks, returnValue
from twisted.python.failure import Failure
from txzookeeper.tests import ZookeeperTestCase, utils
from txzookeeper.client import (ZookeeperClient, ZOO_OPEN_ACL_UNSAFE)
PUBLIC_ACL = ZOO_OPEN_ACL_UNSAFE
class SecurityTests(ZookeeperTestCase):
ident_bob = "bob:bob"
ident_alice = "alice:alice"
ident_eve = "eve:eve"
ident_chuck = "chuck:chuck"
ident_unittest = "unittest:unittest"
def setUp(self):
super(SecurityTests, self).setUp()
self.clients = []
self.test_cleanup_connection = ZookeeperClient("127.0.0.1:2181", 2000)
self.access_control_test_cleanup_entry = self.make_ac(
self.ident_unittest, all=True, admin=True)
return self.open_and_authenticate(
self.test_cleanup_connection, self.ident_unittest)
def tearDown(self):
utils.deleteTree(handle=self.test_cleanup_connection.handle)
for client in self.clients:
if client.connected:
client.close()
self.test_cleanup_connection.close()
@inlineCallbacks
def open_and_authenticate(self, client, credentials):
"""authentication so the test always has access to clean up the
zookeeper node tree. synchronous auth to avoid using deferred
during setup."""
yield client.connect()
d = client.add_auth("digest", credentials)
# hack to keep auth fast
yield client.exists("/")
yield d
returnValue(client)
@inlineCallbacks
def connect_users(self, *users):
clients = []
for name in users:
ident_user = getattr(self, "ident_%s" % (name), None)
if ident_user is None:
raise AttributeError("Invalid User %s" % (name))
client = ZookeeperClient("127.0.0.1:2181", 3000)
clients.append(client)
yield self.open_and_authenticate(client, ident_user)
self.clients.extend(clients)
returnValue(clients)
@inlineCallbacks
def sync_clients(self, *clients):
for client in clients:
yield client.sync()
def ensure_auth_failure(self, result):
if isinstance(result, Failure):
self.assertTrue(isinstance(
result.value, zookeeper.NoAuthException))
return
self.fail("should have raised auth exception")
def make_acl(self, *access_control_entries):
"""
Take the variable number of access control entries and return a
list suitable for passing to the txzookeeper's api as an ACL.
Also automatically appends the test acess control entry to ensure
that the test can cleanup regardless of node permissions set within
a test.
"""
access_control_list = list(access_control_entries)
access_control_list.append(self.access_control_test_cleanup_entry)
return access_control_list
def make_ac(self, credentials, **kw):
"""
Given a username:password credential and boolean keyword arguments
corresponding to permissions construct an access control entry.
"""
user, password = credentials.split(":")
identity = "%s:%s" % (
user,
base64.b64encode(hashlib.new('sha1', credentials).digest()))
permissions = None
for name, perm in (('read', zookeeper.PERM_READ),
('write', zookeeper.PERM_WRITE),
('delete', zookeeper.PERM_DELETE),
('create', zookeeper.PERM_CREATE),
('admin', zookeeper.PERM_ADMIN),
('all', zookeeper.PERM_ALL)):
if name not in kw:
continue
if permissions is None:
permissions = perm
else:
permissions = permissions | perm
if permissions is None:
raise SyntaxError("No permissions specified")
access_control_entry = {
'id': identity, 'scheme': 'digest', 'perms': permissions}
return access_control_entry
@inlineCallbacks
def test_bob_message_for_alice_with_eve_reading(self):
"""
If bob creates a message for alice to read, eve cannot read
it.
"""
bob, alice, eve = yield self.connect_users(
"bob", "alice", "eve")
yield bob.create(
"/message_inbox", "message for alice",
self.make_acl(
self.make_ac(self.ident_bob, write=True, read=True),
self.make_ac(self.ident_alice, read=True)))
message_content, message_stat = yield alice.get("/message_inbox")
self.assertEqual(message_content, "message for alice")
d = eve.get("/message_inbox")
d.addBoth(self.ensure_auth_failure)
yield d
@inlineCallbacks
def test_alice_message_box_for_bob_with_eve_deleting(self):
"""
If alice makes a folder to drop off messages to bob, neither bob nor
eve can write to it, and bob can only read, and delete the messages.
The permission for deleting is set on the container node. Bob has
delete permission only on the on the container, and can delete nodes.
Even if eve has permission to delete on the message node, without the
container permission it will not succeed.
"""
bob, alice, eve = yield self.connect_users("bob", "alice", "eve")
yield alice.create(
"/from_alice", "messages from alice",
self.make_acl(
self.make_ac(self.ident_alice, create=True, write=True),
self.make_ac(self.ident_bob, read=True, delete=True))),
# make sure all the clients have a consistent view
yield self.sync_clients(alice, bob, eve)
# bob can't create messages in the mailbox
d = bob.create("/from_alice/love_letter", "test")
d.addBoth(self.ensure_auth_failure)
# alice's message can only be read by bob.
path = yield alice.create(
"/from_alice/appreciate_letter", "great",
self.make_acl(
self.make_ac(self.ident_eve, delete=True),
self.make_ac(self.ident_bob, read=True),
self.make_ac(self.ident_alice, create=True, write=True)))
message_content, node_stat = yield bob.get(path)
self.assertEqual(message_content, "great")
# make sure all the clients have a consistent view
yield self.sync_clients(alice, bob, eve)
# eve can neither read nor delete
d = eve.get(path)
d.addBoth(self.ensure_auth_failure)
yield d
d = eve.delete(path)
d.addBoth(self.ensure_auth_failure)
yield d
# bob can delete the message when he's done reading.
yield bob.delete(path)
def test_eve_can_discover_node_path(self):
"""
One weakness of the zookeeper security model, is that it enables
discovery of a node existance, its node stats, and its acl to
any inquiring party.
The acl is read off the node and then used as enforcement to any
policy. Ideally it should validate exists and get_acl against
the read permission on the node.
Here bob creates a node that only he can read or write to, but
eve can still get node stat on the node if she knows the path.
"""
bob, eve = yield self.connect_users("bob", "eve")
yield bob.create("/bobsafeplace", "",
self.make_acl(self.make_ac(self.ident_bob, all=True)))
yield bob.create("/bobsafeplace/secret-a", "supersecret",
self.make_acl(self.make_ac(self.ident_bob, all=True)))
self.sync_clients(bob, eve)
d = eve.exists("/bobsafeplace")
def verify_node_stat(node_stat):
self.assertEqual(node_stat["dataLength"], len("supersecret"))
self.assertEqual(node_stat["version"], 0)
d.addCallback(verify_node_stat)
yield d
def test_eve_can_discover_node_acl(self):
"""
One weakness of the zookeeper security model, is that it enables
discovery of a node existance, its node stats, and its acl to
any inquiring party.
The acl is read off the node and then used as enforcement to any
policy. Ideally it should validate exists and get_acl against
the read permission on the node.
Here bob creates a node that only he can read or write to, but
eve can still get node stat and acl information on the node if
she knows the path.
"""
bob, eve = yield self.connect_users("bob", "eve")
yield bob.create("/bobsafeplace", "",
self.make_acl(self.make_ac(self.ident_bob, all=True)))
yield bob.create("/bobsafeplace/secret-a", "supersecret",
self.make_acl(self.make_ac(self.ident_bob, all=True)))
self.sync_clients(bob, eve)
d = eve.get_acl("/bobsafeplace/secret-a")
def verify_node_stat_and_acl((acl, node_stat)):
self.assertEqual(node_stat["dataLength"], len("supersecret"))
self.assertEqual(node_stat["version"], 0)
self.assertEqual(acl[0]["id"].split(":")[0], "bob")
d.addCallback(verify_node_stat_and_acl)
yield d
|