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<title>H.5 What is vanguardism and why do anarchists reject it?

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<h1>H.5 What is vanguardism and why do anarchists reject it?</h1>

<p>
Many socialists follow the ideas of Lenin and, in particular,
his ideas on vanguard parties. These ideas were expounded by 
Lenin in his (in)famous work <b>What is to be Done?</b> which 
is considered as one of the important books in the development 
of Bolshevism. 
</p><p>
The core of these ideas is the concept of <i>"vanguardism,"</i> or
the <i>"vanguard party."</i> According to this perspective, socialists
need to organise together in a party, based on the principles 
of <i>"democratic centralism,"</i> which aims to gain a decisive 
influence in the class struggle. The ultimate aim of such a
party is revolution and its seizure of power. Its short term 
aim is to gather into it all <i>"class conscious"</i> workers into
a <i>"efficient"</i> and <i>"effective"</i> party, alongside members of 
other classes who consider themselves as revolutionary Marxists.
The party would be strictly centralised, with all members 
expected to submit to party decisions, speak in one voice and
act in one way. Without this <i>"vanguard,"</i> injecting its politics
into the working class (who, it is asserted, can only reach 
trade union consciousness by its own efforts), a revolution
is impossible.
</p><p>
Lenin laid the foundation of this kind of party in his book
<b>What is to be Done?</b> and the vision of the <i>"vanguard"</i> party 
was explicitly formalised in the Communist International. As
Lenin put it, <i>"Bolshevism <b>has created</b> the ideological and
tactical foundations of a Third International . . . Bolshevism
<b>can serve as a model of tactics for all.</b>"</i> [<b>Collected Works</b>,
vol. 28, pp. 292-3] Using the Russian Communist Party as its 
model, Bolshevik ideas on party organisation were raised as 
a model for revolutionaries across the world. Since then, the 
various followers of Leninism and its offshoots like Trotskyism
have organised themselves in this manner (with varying success).
</p><p>
The wisdom of applying an organisational model that had been 
developed in the semi-feudal conditions of Tsarist Russia to 
<b>every</b> country, regardless of its level of development, has 
been questioned by anarchists from the start. After all, could
it not be wiser to build upon the revolutionary tendencies 
which had developed in specific countries rather than import 
a new model which had been created for, and shaped by, radically
different social, political and economic conditions? The 
wisdom of applying the vanguard model is not questioned 
on these (essentially materialist) points by those who 
subscribe to it. While revolutionary workers in the advanced
capitalist nations subscribed to anarchist and syndicalist ideas,
this tradition is rejected in favour of one developed by, in
the main, bourgeois intellectuals in a nation which was still
primarily feudal and absolutist. The lessons learned from years
of struggle in actual capitalist societies were simply rejected
in favour of those from a party operating under Tsarism. While 
most supporters of vanguardism will admit that conditions 
now are different than in Tsarist Russia, they still subscribe 
to organisational method developed in that context and justify
it, ironically enough, because of its "success" in the totally
different conditions that prevailed in Russia in the early 
20th Century! And Leninists claim to be materialists! 
</p><p>
Perhaps the reason why Bolshevism rejected the materialist approach 
was because most of the revolutionary movements in advanced 
capitalist countries were explicitly anti-parliamentarian, direct 
actionist, decentralist, federalist and influenced by libertarian 
ideas? This materialist analysis was a key aspect of the council
communist critique of Lenin's <b>Left-Wing Communism</b>, for 
example (see Herman Gorter's <b>Open Letter to Comrade Lenin</b> 
for one excellent reply to Bolshevik arguments, tactics and 
assumptions). This attempt to squeeze every working class movement 
into <b>one</b> "officially approved" model dates back to Marx and 
Engels. Faced with any working class movement which did <b>not</b> 
subscribe to their vision of what they should be doing (namely 
organising in political parties to take part in "political action," 
i.e. standing in bourgeois elections) they simply labelled it as
the product of non-proletarian "sects." They went so far as
to gerrymander the 1872 conference of the First International 
to make acceptance of "political action" mandatory on all 
sections in an attempt to destroy anarchist influence in it.
</p><p>
So this section of our FAQ will explain why anarchists reject 
this model. In our view, the whole concept of a <i>"vanguard
party"</i> is fundamentally anti-socialist. Rather than present an
effective and efficient means of achieving revolution, the 
Leninist model is elitist, hierarchical and highly inefficient
in achieving a socialist society. At best, these parties play
a harmful role in the class struggle by alienating activists
and militants with their organisational principles and manipulative
tactics within popular structures and groups. At worse, these
parties can seize power and create a new form of class society
(a state capitalist one) in which the working class is oppressed
by new bosses (namely, the party hierarchy and its appointees).
</p><p>
However, before discussing why anarchists reject "vanguardism"
we need to stress a few points. Firstly, anarchists recognise 
the obvious fact that the working class is divided in terms 
of political consciousness. Secondly, from this fact most 
anarchists recognise the need to organise together to 
spread our ideas as well as taking part in, influencing 
and learning from the class struggle. As such, anarchists 
have long been aware of the need for revolutionaries
to organise <b>as revolutionaries.</b> Thirdly, anarchists are
well aware of the importance of revolutionary minorities 
playing an inspiring and "leading" role in the class struggle.
We do not reject the need for revolutionaries to <i>"give a 
lead"</i> in struggles, we reject the idea of institutionalised 
leadership and the creation of a leader/led hierarchy 
implicit (and sometimes no so implicit) in vanguardism.
</p><p>
As such, we do not oppose <i>"vanguardism"</i> for these reasons. 
So when Leninists like Tony Cliff argue that it is 
<i>"unevenness in the class [which] makes the party necessary,"</i> 
anarchists reply that <i>"unevenness in the class"</i> makes it 
essential that revolutionaries organise together to influence 
the class but that organisation does not and need not take 
the form of a vanguard party. [Tony Cliff, <b>Lenin</b>, vol. 2, 
p. 149] This is because we reject the concept and practice 
for three reasons. 
</p><p>
Firstly, and most importantly, anarchists reject the underlying
assumption of vanguardism. It is based on the argument that 
<i>"socialist consciousness"</i> has to be introduced into the 
working class from outside. We argue that not only is this position  
empirically false, it is fundamentally anti-socialist in nature. 
This is because it logically denies that the emancipation of the 
working class is the task of the working class itself. Moreover, 
it serves to justify elite rule. Some Leninists, embarrassed by 
the obvious anti-socialist nature of this concept, try and argue 
that Lenin (and so Leninism) does not hold this position. We show
that such claims are false.
</p><p>
Secondly, there is the question of organisational structure. Vanguard 
parties are based on the principle of <i>"democratic centralism"</i>. 
Anarchists argue that such parties, while centralised, are not, in fact, 
democratic nor can they be. As such, the <i>"revolutionary"</i> or 
<i>"socialist"</i> party is no such thing as it reflects the structure 
of the capitalist system it claims to oppose.
</p><p>
Lastly, anarchists argue that such parties are, despite the 
claims of their supporters, not actually very efficient or
effective in the revolutionary sense of the word. At best, 
they hinder the class struggle by being slow to respond to
rapidly changing situations. At worse, they are "efficient" in 
shaping both the revolution and the post-revolutionary society 
in a hierarchical fashion, so re-creating class rule. 
</p><p>
So these are key aspects of the anarchist critique of vanguardism,
which we discuss in more depth in the following sections. It is a 
bit artificial to divide these issues into different sections
because they are all related. The role of the party implies a
specific form of organisation (as Lenin himself stressed), the
form of the party influences its effectiveness. It is for ease of 
presentation we divide up our discussion so. 
</p>

<a name="sech51"><h2>H.5.1 Why are vanguard parties anti-socialist?</h2></a>

<p>
The reason why vanguard parties are anti-socialist is simply
because of the role assigned to them by Lenin, which he thought
was vital. Simply put, without the party, no revolution would 
be possible. As Lenin put it in 1900, <i>"[i]solated from 
Social-Democracy, the working class movement becomes petty 
and inevitably becomes bourgeois."</i> [<b>Collected Works</b>, vol. 
4, p. 368] In <b>What is to be Done?</b>, he expands on this position:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers
<b>only from without,</b> that is, only outside of the economic
struggle, outside the sphere of relations between workers and
employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain
this knowledge is the sphere of relationships between <b>all</b> the
various classes and strata and the state and the government -
the sphere of the interrelations between <b>all</b> the various 
classes."</i> [<b>Essential Works of Lenin</b>, p. 112]
</blockquote></p><p>
Thus the role of the party is to inject socialist politics into
a class incapable of developing them itself. 
</p><p>
Lenin is at pains to stress the Marxist orthodoxy of his claims
and quotes the <i>"profoundly true and important"</i> comments of Karl
Kautsky on the subject. [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 81] Kautsky, considered
the "pope" of Social-Democracy, stated that it was <i>"absolutely
untrue"</i> that <i>"socialist consciousness"</i> was a <i>"necessary and 
direct result of the proletarian class struggle."</i> Rather, 
<i>"socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not 
one out of the other . . . Modern socialist consciousness can 
arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge . . . 
The vehicles of science are not the proletariat, but the 
<b>bourgeois intelligentsia</b>: it was in the minds of some members 
of this stratum that modern socialism originated, and it was 
they who communicated it to the more intellectually developed 
proletarians who, in their turn, introduced it into the 
proletarian class struggle."</i> Kautsky stressed that <i>"socialist 
consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian 
class struggle from without."</i> [quoted by Lenin, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
pp. 81-2]
</p><p>
So Lenin, it must be stressed, was not inventing anything new here. He
was simply repeating the orthodox Marxist position and, as is obvious, 
wholeheartedly agreed with Kautsky's pronouncements (any attempt to 
claim that he did not or later rejected it is nonsense, as we prove 
in <a href="secH5.html#sech54">section H.5.4</a>). Lenin, with his 
usual modesty, claimed to speak on behalf of the workers when
he wrote that <i>"intellectuals must talk to us, and tell us more 
about what we do not know and what we can never learn from our 
factory and 'economic' experience, that is, you must give us 
political knowledge."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 108] Thus we have Lenin 
painting a picture of a working class incapable of developing
<i>"political knowledge"</i> or <i>"socialist consciousness"</i> by its 
own efforts and so is reliant on members of the party, 
themselves either radical elements of the bourgeoisie and 
petty-bourgeoisie or educated by them, to provide it with such 
knowledge. 
</p><p>
The obvious implication of this argument is that the working class 
cannot liberate itself by its own efforts. Without the radical 
bourgeois to provide the working class with "socialist" ideas, a 
socialist movement, let alone society, is impossible. If the working 
class cannot develop its own political theory by its own efforts 
then it cannot conceive of transforming society and, at best, can 
see only the need to work within capitalism for reforms to improve 
its position in society. A class whose members cannot develop 
political knowledge by its own actions cannot emancipate itself. 
It is, by necessity, dependent on others to shape and form its 
movements.  To quote Trotsky's telling analogy on the respective 
roles of party and class, leaders and led: 
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"Without a guiding organisation, the energy of the masses 
would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston. But 
nevertheless, what moves things is not the piston or the 
box, but the steam."</i> [<b>History of the Russian Revolution</b>, 
vol. 1, p. 17] 
</blockquote></p><p>
While Trotsky's mechanistic analogy may be considered as 
somewhat crude, it does expose the underlying assumptions 
of Bolshevism. After all, did not Lenin argue that the 
working class could not develop <i>"socialist consciousness"</i> 
by themselves and that it had to be introduced from without?
How can you expect steam to create a piston? You cannot.
Thus we have a blind, elemental force incapable of conscious 
thought being guided by a creation of science, the piston 
(which, of course, is a product of the work of the <i>"vehicles 
of science,"</i> namely the <b>bourgeois intelligentsia</b>). In the 
Leninist perspective, if revolutions are the locomotives 
of history (to use Marx's words) then the masses are the 
steam, the party the locomotive and the leaders the train 
driver. The idea of a future society being constructed 
democratically from below by the workers themselves rather 
than through periodically elected leaders seems to have
passed Bolshevism past. This is unsurprising, given that 
the Bolsheviks saw the workers in terms of blindly moving 
steam in a box, something incapable of being creative unless 
an outside force gave them direction (instructions). 
</p><p>
Libertarian socialist Cornelius Castoriadis provides a good 
critique of the implications of the Leninist position:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"No positive content, nothing new capable of providing 
the foundation for the reconstruction of society could
arise out of a mere awareness of poverty. From the 
experience of life under capitalism the proletariat 
could derive no new principles either for organising 
this new society or for orientating it in another 
direction. Under such conditions, the proletarian 
revolution becomes . . . a simple reflex revolt against
hunger. It is impossible to see how socialist society 
could ever be the result of such a reflex . . . Their
situation forces them to suffer the consequences of
capitalism's contradictions, but in no way does it 
lead them to discover its causes. An acquaintance with
these causes comes not from experiencing the production
process but from theoretical knowledge . . . This
knowledge may be accessible to individual workers, but
not to the proletariat <b>qua</b> proletariat. Driven by
its revolt against poverty, but incapable of self-direction
since its experiences does not give it a privileged 
viewpoint on reality, the proletariat according to this
outlook, can only be an infantry in the service of a 
general staff of specialists. These specialists <b>know</b>
(from considerations that the proletariat as such does
not have access to) what is going wrong with present-day
society and how it must be modified. The traditional view
of the economy and its revolutionary perspective can only
found, and actually throughout history has only founded,
a <b>bureaucratic politics</b> . . . [W]hat we have outlined
are the consequences that follow objectively from this
theory. And they have been affirmed in an ever clearer
fashion within the actual historical movement of Marxism,
culminating in Stalinism."</i> [<b>Social and Political Writings</b>,
vol. 2, pp. 257-8]
</blockquote></p><p>
Thus we have a privileged position for the party and a
perspective which can (and did) justify party dictatorship 
<b>over</b> the proletariat. Given the perspective that the 
working class cannot formulate its own "ideology" by its 
own efforts, of its incapacity to move beyond <i>"trade union
consciousness"</i> independently of the party, the clear 
implication is that the party could in no way be bound 
by the predominant views of the working class. As the
party embodies <i>"socialist consciousness"</i> (and this arises
outside the working class and its struggles) then 
opposition of the working class to the party signifies
a failure of the class to resist alien influences. As
Lenin put it:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology being
developed by the masses of the workers in the process of
their movement, <b>the only choice is</b>: either bourgeois or
socialist ideology. There is no middle course . . . Hence,
to belittle socialist ideology <b>in any way,</b> to <b>deviate
from it in the slightest degree</b> means strengthening 
bourgeois ideology. There is a lot of talk about spontaneity,
but the <b>spontaneous</b> development of the labour movement 
leads to its becoming subordinated to bourgeois ideology
. . . Hence our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is to
<b>combat spontaneity,</b> to <b>divert</b> the labour movement from
its spontaneous, trade unionist striving to go under the
wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of
revolutionary Social-Democracy."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 82-3]
</blockquote></p><p>
The implications of this argument became clear once the 
Bolsheviks seized power. As a justification for party 
dictatorship, you would be hard pressed to find any 
better. If the working class revolts against the 
ruling party, then we have a <i>"spontaneous"</i> development 
which, inevitably, is an expression of bourgeois ideology. 
As the party represents socialist consciousness, any 
deviation in working class support for it simply meant 
that the working class was being <i>"subordinated"</i> to the 
bourgeoisie. This meant, obviously, that to <i>"belittle"</i> 
the <i>"role"</i> of the party by questioning its rule meant 
to <i>"strengthen bourgeois ideology"</i> and when workers 
spontaneously went on strike or protested against the 
party's rule, the party had to <i>"combat"</i> these strivings 
in order to maintain working class rule! As the <i>"masses 
of the workers"</i> cannot develop an <i>"independent ideology,"</i> 
the workers are rejecting socialist ideology in favour of 
bourgeois ideology. The party, in order to defend the 
"the revolution" (even the "rule of the workers"!) has 
to impose its will onto the class, to <i>"combat spontaneity."</i> 
</p><p>
As we saw in 
<a href="secH1.html#sech12">section H.1.2</a>, none of the leading Bolsheviks 
were shy about drawing these conclusions once in power and 
faced with working class revolt against their rule. Indeed, 
they raised the idea that the <i>"dictatorship of the 
proletariat"</i> was also, in fact, the <i>"dictatorship of 
the party"</i> and, as we discussed in 
<a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a> integrated
this into their theory of the state. Thus, Leninist ideology 
implies that <i>"workers' power"</i> exists independently of the 
workers. This means that the sight of the <i>"dictatorship of 
the proletariat"</i> (i.e. the Bolshevik government) repressing 
the proletariat is to be expected.
</p><p>
This elitist perspective of the party, the idea that it and it 
alone possesses knowledge can be seen from the resolution of the 
Communist International on the role of the party. It stated that 
<i>"the working class without an independent political party is 
a body without a head."</i> [<b>Proceedings and Documents of the 
Second Congress 1920</b>, vol. 1, p. 194] This use of biological 
analogies says more about Bolshevism that its authors intended. 
After all, it suggests a division of labour which is unchangeable. 
Can the hands evolve to do their own thinking? Of course not. Yet 
again, we have an image of the class as unthinking brute force. 
As the Cohen-Bendit brothers argued, the <i>"Leninist belief that 
the workers cannot spontaneously go beyond the level of trade union 
consciousness is tantamount to beheading the proletariat, and then 
insinuating the Party as the head . . . Lenin was wrong, and in 
fact, in Russia the Party was forced to decapitate the workers' 
movement with the help of the political police and the Red Army
under the brilliant leadership of Trotsky and Lenin."</i> 
[<b>Obsolute Communism</b>, pp. 194-5]
</p><p>
As well as explaining the subsequent embrace of party 
dictatorship <b>over</b> the working class, vanguardism also
explains the notorious inefficiency of Leninist parties
faced with revolutionary situations we discuss in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech58">section H.5.8</a>. Basing themselves 
on the perspective that all spontaneous movements are inherently
bourgeois they could not help but be opposed to autonomous
class struggle and the organisations and tactics it 
generates. James C. Scott, in his excellent discussion 
of the roots and flaws in Lenin's ideas on the party, 
makes the obvious point that since, for Lenin, <i>"authentic,
revolutionary class consciousness could never develop
autonomously within the working class, it followed that
that the actual political outlook of workers was always
a threat to the vanguard party."</i> [<b>Seeing like a State</b>,
p. 155] As Maurice Brinton argued, the <i>"Bolshevik cadres saw 
their role as the leadership of the revolution. Any movement not 
initiated by them or independent of their control could only 
evoke their suspicion."</i> These developments, of course, did 
not occur by chance or accidentally for <i>"a given ideological 
premise (the preordained hegemony of the Party) led necessarily 
to certain conclusions in practice."</i> [<b>The Bolsheviks and 
Workers' Control</b>, p. xi and p. xii] 
</p><p>
Bakunin expressed the implications of the vanguardist 
perspective extremely well. It is worthwhile quoting 
him at length:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"Idealists of all sorts, metaphysicians, positivists, 
those who uphold the priority of science over life, the 
doctrinaire revolutionists - all of them champion with 
equal zeal although differing in their argumentation, 
the idea of the State and State power, seeing in them, 
quite logically from their point of view, the only 
salvation of society. <b>Quite logically,</b> I say, having
taken as their basis the tenet - a fallacious tenet in 
our opinion - that thought is prior to life, and 
abstract theory is prior to social practice, and that 
therefore sociological science must become the starting 
point for social upheavals and social reconstruction - 
they necessarily arrived at the conclusion that since 
thought, theory, and science are, for the present at 
least, the property of only a very few people, those 
few should direct social life; and that on the morrow
of the Revolution the new social organisation should 
be set up not by the free integration of workers' 
associations, villages, communes, and regions from 
below upward, conforming to the needs and instincts 
of the people, but solely by the dictatorial power of 
this learned minority, allegedly expressing the general 
will of the people."</i> [<b>The Political Philosophy of 
Bakunin</b>, pp. 283-4]
</blockquote></p><p>
The idea that <i>"socialist consciousness"</i> can exist independently
of the working class and its struggle suggests exactly the
perspective Bakunin was critiquing. For vanguardism, the abstract 
theory of socialism exists prior to the class struggle and 
exists waiting to be brought to the masses by the educated few. 
The net effect is, as we have argued, to lay the ground for party 
dictatorship. The concept is fundamentally anti-socialist, 
a justification for elite rule and the continuation of class 
society in new, party approved, ways.</p>

<a name="sech52"><h2>H.5.2 Have vanguardist assumptions been validated?</h2></a>

<p>
Lenin claimed that workers can only reach a <i>"trade union consciousness"</i> 
by their own efforts. Anarchists argue that such an assertion is empirically 
false. The history of the labour movement is marked by revolts and struggles 
which went far further than just seeking reforms as well as revolutionary 
theories derived from such experiences. 
</p><p>
The category of <i>"economic struggle"</i> corresponds to no known social 
reality. Every <i>"economic"</i> struggle is <i>"political"</i> in some 
sense and those involved can, and do, learn political lessons from them. 
As Kropotkin noted in the 1880s, there <i>"is almost no serious strike 
which occurs together with the appearance of troops, the exchange of 
blows and some acts of revolt. Here they fight with the troops; there 
they march on the factories . . . Thanks to government intervention the 
rebel against the factory becomes the rebel against the State."</i> 
[quoted by Caroline Cahm, <b>Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary 
Anarchism</b>, p. 256] If history shows anything, it shows that workers 
are more than capable of going beyond <i>"trade union consciousness."</i> 
The Paris Commune, the 1848 revolts and, ironically enough, the 1905 and 
1917 Russian Revolutions show that the masses are capable of revolutionary 
struggles in which the self-proclaimed <i>"vanguard"</i> of socialists 
spend most of their time trying to catch up with them! 
</p><p>
The history of Bolshevism also helps discredit Lenin's argument that 
the workers cannot develop socialist consciousness alone due to the 
power of bourgeois ideology. Simply put, if the working class is 
subjected to bourgeois influences, then so are the <i>"professional"</i> 
revolutionaries within the party. Indeed, the strength of such 
influences on the "professionals" of revolution <b>must</b> be higher 
as they are not part of proletarian life. If social being influences 
consciousness then if a revolutionary is no longer part of the working 
class then they no longer are rooted in the social conditions which 
generate socialist theory and action. No longer connected with 
collective labour and working class life, the <i>"professional"</i> 
revolutionary is more likely to be influenced by the social milieu he 
or she now is part of (i.e. a bourgeois, or at best petit-bourgeois, 
environment).
</p><p>
This tendency for the <i>"professional"</i> revolutionary to be subject 
to bourgeois influences can continually be seen from the history of the 
Bolshevik party. As Trotsky himself noted: 
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"It should not be forgotten that the political machine of
the Bolshevik Party was predominantly made up of the 
intelligentsia, which was petty bourgeois in its origin
and conditions of life and Marxist in its ideas and in
its relations with the proletariat. Workers who turned 
professional revolutionists joined this set with great
eagerness and lost their identity in it. The peculiar 
social structure of the Party machine and its authority
over the proletariat (neither of which is accidental
but dictated by strict historical necessity) were more
than once the cause of the Party's vacillation and 
finally became the source of its degeneration . . . In 
most cases they lacked independent daily contact with 
the labouring masses as well as a comprehensive 
understanding of the historical process. They thus left
themselves exposed to the influence of alien classes."</i> 
[<b>Stalin</b>, vol. 1, pp. 297-8]
</blockquote></p><p>
He pointed to the example of the First World War, when,
<i>"even the Bolshevik party did not at once find its way
in the labyrinth of war. As a general rule, the confusion
was most pervasive and lasted longest amongst the Party's
higher-ups, who came in direct contact with bourgeois
public opinion."</i> Thus the professional revolutionaries 
<i>"were largely affected by compromisist tendencies, which 
emanated from bourgeois circles, while the rank and file 
Bolshevik workingmen displayed far greater stability resisting 
the patriotic hysteria that had swept the country."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 248 and p. 298] It should be noted that 
he was repeating earlier comments on the <i>"immense 
intellectual backsliding of the upper stratum of the 
Bolsheviks during the war"</i> was caused by <i>"isolation 
from the masses and isolation from those abroad - that is 
primarily from Lenin."</i> [<b>History of the Russian 
Revolution</b>, vol. 3, p. 134] As we discuss in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech512">section H.5.12</a>, even Trotsky 
had to admit that during 1917 the working class was far more 
revolutionary than the party and the party more revolutionary 
than the <i>"party machine"</i> of <i>"professional revolutionaries."</i>
</p><p>
Ironically enough, Lenin himself recognised this aspect of
intellectuals after he had praised their role in bringing
"revolutionary" consciousness to the working class. In his
1904 work <b>One Step Forward, Two Steps Back</b>, he argued 
that it was now the presence of <i>"large numbers of radical 
intellectuals in the ranks"</i> which has ensured that <i>"the 
opportunism which their mentality produces had been, and is, bound 
to exist."</i> [<b>Collected Works</b>, vol. 7, pp. 403-4] According 
to Lenin's new philosophy, the working class simply needs to have been 
through the <i>"schooling of the factory"</i> in order to give the 
intelligentsia lessons in political discipline, the very
same intelligentsia which up until then had played the leading 
role in the Party and had given political consciousness to
the working class. In his words:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"For the factory, which seems only a bogey to some, represents
that highest form of capitalist co-operation which has united 
and disciplined the proletariat, taught it to organise . . . 
And it is Marxism, the ideology of the proletariat trained by 
capitalism, has been and is teaching . . . unstable intellectuals 
to distinguish between the factory as a means of exploitation 
(discipline based on fear of starvation) and the factory as a 
means of organisation (discipline based on collective work . . .).
The discipline and organisation which come so hard to the bourgeois 
intellectual are very easily acquired by the proletariat just because 
of this factory 'schooling.'"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 392-3]
</blockquote></p><p>
Lenin's analogy is, of course, flawed. The factory is a <i>"means
of exploitation"</i> because its <i>"means of organisation"</i> is top-down
and hierarchical. The <i>"collective work"</i> which the workers are
subjected to is organised by the boss and the <i>"discipline"</i> is
that of the barracks, not that of free individuals. In fact, 
the <i>"schooling"</i> for revolutionaries is <b>not</b> the factory, 
but the class struggle - healthy and positive self-discipline 
is generated by the struggle against the way the workplace is
organised under capitalism. Factory discipline, in other words, 
is completely different from the discipline required for social
struggle or revolution. Workers become revolutionary in so far as 
they reject the hierarchical discipline of the workplace and develop 
the self-discipline required to fight it.
</p><p>
A key task of anarchism is to encourage working class revolt 
against this type of discipline, particularly in the 
capitalist workplace. The <i>"discipline"</i> Lenin praises 
simply replaces human thought and association with the 
following of orders and hierarchy. Thus anarchism aims to 
undermine capitalist (imposed and brutalising) discipline 
in favour of solidarity, the <i>"discipline"</i> of free association 
and agreement based on the community of struggle and the 
political consciousness and revolutionary enthusiasm that 
struggle creates. Thus, for anarchists, the model of the 
factory can never be the model for a revolutionary organisation 
any more than Lenin's vision of society as <i>"one big workplace"</i> 
could be our vision of socialism (see 
<a href="secH3.html#sech31">section H.3.1</a>). Ultimately, the 
factory exists to reproduce hierarchical social relationships 
and class society just as much as it exists to produce goods.
</p><p>
It should be noted that Lenin's argument does not contradict
his earlier ones. The proletarian and intellectual have 
complementary jobs in the party. The proletariat is to give 
lessons in political discipline to the intellectuals as they 
have been through the process of factory (i.e. hierarchical) 
discipline. The role of the intellectuals as providers of 
<i>"political consciousness"</i> is the same and so they give 
political lessons to the workers. Moreover, his vision of 
the vanguard party is basically the same as in <b>What is 
to Be Done?</b>. This can be seen from his comments that 
the leading Menshevik Martov <i>"<b>lumps together</b> in 
the party organised and unorganised elements, those who lend
themselves to direction and those who do not, the advanced and 
the incorrigibly backward."</i> He stressed that the <i>"division 
of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him [the 
intellectual] a tragicomical outcry against transforming people 
into 'cogs and wheels.'"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 258 and p. 392] 
Thus there is the same division of labour as in the capitalist 
factory, with the boss (the <i>"centre"</i>) having the power 
to direct the workers (who submit to <i>"direction"</i>). Thus 
we have a "revolutionary" party organised in a <b>capitalist</b> 
manner, with the same <i>"division of labour"</i> between order 
givers and order takers.</p>

<a name="sech53"><h2>H.5.3 Why does vanguardism imply party power?</h2></a>

<p>
As we discussed in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech51">section H.5.1</a>, anarchists argue 
that the assumptions of vanguardism lead to party rule over the
working class. Needless to say, followers of Lenin disagree. 
For example, Chris Harman of the British <b>Socialist Workers 
Party</b> argues the opposite case in his essay <i>"Party and Class."</i> 
However, his own argument suggests the elitist conclusions 
libertarians have draw from Lenin's.
</p><p>
Harman argues that there are two ways to look at the
revolutionary party, the Leninist way and the traditional 
social-democratic way (as represented by the likes of 
Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg in 1903-5). <i>"The latter,"</i> 
he argues, <i>"was thought of as a party of the whole [working]
class . . . All the tendencies within the class had to be
represented within it. Any split within it was to be
conceived of as a split within the class. Centralisation,
although recognised as necessary, was feared as a centralisation
over and against the spontaneous activity of the class. Yet
it was precisely in this kind of party that the 'autocratic' 
tendencies warned against by Luxemburg were to develop most.
For within it the confusion of member and sympathiser, the
massive apparatus needed to hold together a mass of only
half-politicised members in a series of social activities,
led to a toning down of political debate, a lack of political
seriousness, which in turn reduced the ability of the members
to make independent political evaluations and increased the
need for apparatus-induced involvement."</i> [<b>Party and Class</b>, 
p. 32]
</p><p>
Thus, the lumping together into one organisation all those
who consider themselves as <i>"socialist"</i> and agree with the 
party's aims creates in a mass which results in <i>"autocratic"</i> 
tendencies within the party organisation. As such, it is 
important to remember that <i>"the Party, as the vanguard 
of the working class, must not be confused with the entire 
class."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 22] For this reason, the 
party must be organised in a specific manner which reflect 
his Leninist assumptions:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The alternative [to the vanguard party] is the 'marsh' - 
where elements motivated by scientific precision are so mixed 
up with those who are irremediably confused as to prevent any 
decisive action, effectively allowing the most backward to 
lead."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 30]
</blockquote></p><p>
The problem for Harman is to explain how the proletariat
can become the ruling class if this were true. He argues that 
<i>"the party is not the embryo of the workers' state - the
workers' council is. The working class as a whole will be
involved in the organisations that constitute the state,
the most backward as well as the most progressive elements."</i> 
The <i>"function of the party is not to be the state."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 33] The implication is that the working 
class will take an active part in the decision making process
during the revolution (although the level of this <i>"involvement"</i> 
is unspecified, probably for good reasons as we explain).
If this <b>is</b> the case, then the problem of the mass party
reappears, but in a new form (we must also note that this 
problem must have also appearing in 1917, when the Bolshevik
party opened its doors to become a mass party).
</p><p>
As the <i>"organisations that constitute the state"</i> are made
up of the working class <i>"as a whole,"</i> then, obviously, 
they cannot be expected to wield power (i.e. directly 
manage the revolution from below). If they did, then the 
party would be <i>"mixed up"</i> with the <i>"irremediably confused"</i> 
and so could not lead (as we discuss in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech55">section H.5.5</a>,
Lenin linked <i>"opportunism"</i> to <i>"primitive"</i> democracy, i.e.
self-management, within the party). Hence the need for 
party power. Which, of course, explains Lenin's 1920 
comments that an organisation embracing the whole working
class cannot exercise the <i>"dictatorship of the proletariat"</i>
and that a <i>"vanguard"</i> is required to do so (see 
<a href="secH1.html#sech12">section
H.1.2</a> for details). Of course, Harman does not explain how 
the <i>"irremediably confused"</i> are able to judge that the party 
is the best representative of its interests. Surely if 
someone is competent enough to pick their ruler, they must 
also be competent enough to manage their own affairs 
directly? Equally, if the <i>"irremediably confused"</i> vote 
against the party once it is in power, what happens? Will 
the party submit to the <i>"leadership"</i> of what it considers 
<i>"the most backward"</i>? If the Bolsheviks are anything to go 
by, the answer has to be no.
</p><p>
Ironically, Harman argues that it <i>"is worth noting that in Russia
a real victory of the apparatus over the party required precisely the 
bringing into the party hundreds of thousands of 'sympathisers,' a 
dilution of the 'party' by the 'class.' . . . The Leninist party does 
not suffer from this tendency to bureaucratic control precisely because 
it restricts its membership to those willing to be serious and disciplined 
enough to take <b>political</b> and <b>theoretical</b> issues as their
starting point, and to subordinate all their activities to those."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 33] It would be churlish to note that, firstly, the
party had already imposed its dictatorship on the working class by that
time and, secondly, his own party is regularly attacked by its own dissidents
for being bureaucratic (see <a href="secH5.html#sech511">section H.5.11</a>). 
</p><p>
Significantly, this substitution of the rule of the party for working 
class self-government and the party apparatus for the party membership
does not happen by accident. In order to have a socialist revolution, the 
working class as a whole must participate in the process so the decision 
making organisations will be based on the party being <i>"mixed up"</i> 
with the <i>"irremediably confused"</i> as if they were part of a 
non-Leninist party. So from Harman's own assumptions, this by necessity 
results in an <i>"autocratic"</i> regime within the new <i>"workers' state."</i> 
</p><p>
This was implicitly recognised by the Bolsheviks when they stressed that
the function of the party was to become the government, the head 
of the state, to <i>"assume power"</i>, (see 
<a href="secH3.html#sech33">section H.3.3</a>). Thus, while 
the working class <i>"as a whole"</i> will be <i>"involved in the 
organisations that constitute the state,"</i> the party (in practice, 
its leadership) will hold power. And for Trotsky, this substitution 
of the party for the class was inevitable:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"We have more than once been accused of having substituted for 
the dictatorship of the Soviets the dictatorship of our party. 
Yet it can be said with complete justice that the dictatorship 
of the Soviets became possible only by means of the dictatorship 
of the party. It is thanks to the clarity of its theoretical 
vision and its strong revolutionary organisation that the party 
has afforded to the Soviets the possibility of becoming transformed 
from shapeless parliaments of labour into the apparatus of the 
supremacy of labour. In this 'substitution' of the power of the 
party for the power of the working class there is nothing 
accidental, and in reality there is no substitution at all. 
The Communists express the fundamental interests of the working 
class. It is quite natural that, in the period in which history 
brings up those interests . . . the Communists have become the 
recognised representatives of the working class as a whole."</i> 
[<b>Terrorism and Communism</b>, p. 109]
</blockquote></p><p>
He noted that within the state, <i>"the last word belongs to the 
Central Committee of the party."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 107] As
we discuss in <a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a>, he 
held this position into the 1930s.
</p><p>
This means that given Harman's own assumptions, autocratic rule
by the party is inevitable. Ironically, he argues that <i>"to be a 
'vanguard' is not the same as to substitute one's own desires, 
or policies or interests, for those of the class."</i> He stresses 
that an <i>"organisation that is concerned with participating in 
the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism by the working class
cannot conceive of substituting itself for the organs of the 
direct rule of that class."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 33 and p. 34] However, 
the logic of his argument suggests otherwise. Simply put, his
arguments against a broad party organisation are also applicable
to self-management during the class struggle and revolution. 
The rank and file party members are <i>"mixed up"</i> in the class.
This leads to party members becoming subject to bourgeois 
influences. This necessitates the power of the higher bodies 
over the lower (see 
<a href="secH5.html#sech55">section H.5.5</a>). The highest party organ, 
the central committee, must rule over the party machine, which 
in turn rules over the party members, who, in turn, rule over 
the workers. This logical chain was, ironically enough, 
recognised by Trotsky in 1904 in his polemic against Lenin:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The organisation of the party substitutes itself for the
party as a whole; then the central committee substitutes 
itself for the organisation; and finally the 'dictator' 
substitutes himself for the central committee."</i> [quoted 
by Harman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 22]
</blockquote></p><p>
Obviously once in power this substitution was less of a concern 
for him! Which, however, does not deny the insight Trotsky had 
previously showed about the dangers inherent in the Bolshevik 
assumptions on working class spontaneity and how revolutionary 
ideas develop. Dangers which he, ironically, helped provide 
empirical evidence for.
</p><p>
This false picture of the party (and its role) explains the
progression of the Bolshevik party after 1917. As the soviets
organised all workers, we have the problem that the party 
(with its <i>"scientific"</i> knowledge) is swamped by the class. 
The task of the party is to <i>"persuade, not coerce these
[workers] into accepting its lead"</i> and, as Lenin made clear, 
for it to take political power. [Harman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 34] 
Once in power, the decisions of the party are in constant 
danger of being overthrown by the working class, which 
necessitates a state run with <i>"iron discipline"</i> (and the 
necessary means of coercion) by the party. With the 
disempowering of the mass organisations by the party, 
the party itself becomes a substitute for popular 
democracy as being a party member is the only way to 
influence policy. As the party grows, the influx of new 
members <i>"dilutes"</i> the organisation, necessitating a similar 
growth of centralised power at the top of the organisation. 
This eliminated the substitute for proletarian democracy 
which had developed within the party (which explains the 
banning of factions within the Bolshevik party in 1921). 
Slowly but surely, power concentrates into fewer and fewer 
hands, which, ironically enough, necessitates a bureaucracy 
to feed the party leaders information and execute its will. 
Isolated from all, the party inevitably degenerates and 
Stalinism results. 
</p><p>
We are sure that many Trotskyists will object to our
analysis, arguing that we ignore the problems facing the
Russian Revolution in our discussion. Harman argues that 
it was <i>"not the form of the party that produces party as 
opposed to soviet rule, but the decimation of the working 
class"</i> that occurred during the Russian Revolution. [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 37] This is false. As noted, Lenin was always explicit  
about the fact that the Bolshevik's sought party rule (<i>"full
state power"</i>) and that their rule <b>was</b> working class rule. 
As such, we have the first, most basic, substitution of party
power for workers power. Secondly, as we discuss in 
<a href="secH6.html#sech61">section H.6.1</a>, 
the Bolshevik party had been gerrymandering and disbanding 
soviets before the start of the Civil War, so proving that the
war cannot be held accountable for this process of substitution.
Thirdly, Leninists are meant to know that civil war is
inevitable during a revolution. To blame the inevitable for
the degeneration of the revolution is hardly convincing 
(particularly as the degeneration started before the civil
war broke out).
</p><p>
Unsurprisingly, anarchists reject the underlying basis of
this progression, the idea that the working class, by its
own efforts, is incapable of developing beyond a <i>"trade 
union consciousness."</i> The actions of the working class 
itself condemned these attitudes as outdated and simply 
wrong long before Lenin's infamous comments were put on 
paper. In every struggle, the working class has created 
its own organisations to co-ordinate its struggle. In 
the process of struggle, the working class changes 
its perspectives. This process is uneven in both quantity 
and quality, but it does happen. However, anarchists do 
not think that <b>all</b> working class people will, at 
the same time, spontaneously become anarchists. 
If they did, we would be in an anarchist society today! As 
we argue in <a href="secH3.html">section J.3</a>, anarchists 
acknowledge that political development within the working 
class is uneven. The difference between anarchism and Leninism 
is how we see socialist ideas developing and how revolutionaries
influence that process. 
</p><p>
In every class struggle there is a radical minority which takes 
the lead and many of this minority develop revolutionary conclusions 
from their experiences. As such, members of the working class develop 
their own revolutionary theory and it does not need bourgeois 
intellectuals to inject it into them. Anarchists go on to argue that 
this minority (along with any members of other classes who have broken 
with their background and become libertarians) should organise and 
work together. The role of this revolutionary organisation is to 
spread, discuss and revise its ideas and help others draw the 
same conclusions as they have from their own, and others, 
experiences. The aim of such a group is, by word and deed, 
to assist the working class in its struggles and to draw out 
and clarify the libertarian aspects of this struggle. It seeks to 
abolish the rigid division between leaders and led which is the 
hallmark of class society by drawing the vast majority of the 
working class into social struggle and revolutionary politics by 
encouraging their direct management of the struggle. Only this 
participation and the political discussion it generates will allow 
revolutionary ideas to become widespread. 
</p><p>
In other words, anarchists argue that precisely <b>because</b> of 
political differences ("unevenness") we need the fullest possible 
democracy and freedom to discuss issues and reach agreements. Only 
by discussion and self-activity can the political perspectives of 
those in struggle  develop and change. In other words, the fact 
Bolshevism uses to justify its support for party power is 
the strongest argument against it.
</p><p>
Our differences with vanguardism could not be more clear.</p>

<a name="sech54"><h2>H.5.4 Did Lenin abandon vanguardism?</h2></a>

<p>
Vanguardism rests on the premise that the working class cannot emancipate 
itself. As such, the ideas of Lenin as expounded in <b>What is to be 
Done?</b> (<b>WITBD</b>) contradicts the key idea of Marx that the emancipation 
of the working class is the task of the working class itself. Thus the 
paradox of Leninism. On the one hand, it subscribes to an ideology 
allegedly based on working class self-liberation. On the other, the 
founder of that school wrote an obviously influential work whose 
premise not only logically implies that they cannot, it also provides 
the perfect rationale for party dictatorship over the working class 
(and as the history of Leninism in power shows, this underlying premise 
was much stronger than any democratic-sounding rhetoric).
</p><p>
It is for this reason that many Leninists are somewhat embarrassed
by Lenin's argument in that key text. Hence we see Chris Harman writing 
that <i>"the real theoretical basis for [Lenin's] argument on the 
party is not that the working class is incapable on its own of coming 
to theoretical socialist consciousness . . . The real basis for his 
argument is that the level of consciousness in the working class is 
never uniform."</i> [<b>Party and Class</b>, pp. 25-6] In other words, 
Harman changes the focus of the question away from the point explicitly 
and repeatedly stated by Lenin that the working class was incapable 
on its own of coming to socialist consciousness and that he was simply 
repeating Marxist orthodoxy when he did. 
</p><p>
Harman bases his revision on Lenin's later comments regarding
his book, namely that he sought to <i>"straighten matters out"</i> 
by <i>"pull[ing] in the other direction"</i> to the <i>"extreme"</i> 
which the <i>"economists"</i> had went to. [<b>Collected Works</b>, 
vol. 6, p. 491] He repeated this in 1907, as we will discuss 
shortly. While Lenin may have been right to attack the 
<i>"economists"</i>, his argument that socialist consciousness 
comes to the working class only <i>"from without"</i> is not a 
case of going too far in the other direction; it is wrong. 
Simply put, you do not attack ideas you disagree with by arguing
an equally false set of ideas. This suggests that Harman's 
attempt to downplay Lenin's elitist position is flawed. Simply
put, the <i>"real theoretical basis"</i> of the argument was precisely
the issue Lenin himself raised, namely the incapacity of the
working class to achieve socialist consciousness by itself.
It is probably the elitist conclusions of this argument which
drives Harman to try and change the focus to another issue,
namely the political unevenness within the working class.
</p><p>
Some go to even more extreme lengths, denying that Lenin 
even held such a position. For example, Hal Draper argued at 
length that Lenin did not, in fact, hold the opinions he 
actually expressed in his book! While Draper covers many 
aspects of what he called the <i>"Myth of Lenin's 'Concept of 
The Party'"</i> in his essay of the same name, we will 
concentrate on the key idea, namely that socialist ideas 
are developed outside the class struggle by the radical 
intelligentsia and introduced into the working class from 
without. Here, as argued in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech51">section H.5.1</a>, is the root of 
the anti-socialist basis of Leninism.
</p><p>
So what did Draper say? On the one hand, he denied that Lenin
held this theory (he states that it is a <i>"virtually non-existent 
theory"</i> and <i>"non-existent after <b>WITBD</b>"</i>). He argued that 
those who hold the position that Lenin actually meant what he said 
in his book <i>"never quote anything other than <b>WITBD</b>,"</i> and 
stated that this is a <i>"curious fact"</i> (a fact we will disprove 
shortly). Draper argued as follows: <i>"Did Lenin put this theory 
forward even in <b>WITBD</b>? Not exactly."</i> He then noted that Lenin 
<i>"had just read this theory in the most prestigious theoretical 
organ of Marxism of the whole international socialist movement"</i> 
and it had been <i>"put forward in an important article by the 
leading Marxist authority,"</i> Karl Kautsky and so <i>"Lenin first 
paraphrased Kautsky"</i> before <i>"quot[ing] a long passage from 
Kautsky's article."</i>
</p><p>
This much, of course, is well known by anyone who has read Lenin's
book. By paraphrasing and quoting Kautsky as he does, Lenin is
showing his agreement with Kautsky's argument. Indeed, Lenin
states before quoting Kautsky that his comments are <i>"profoundly
true and important"</i>. [<b>Essential Works of Lenin</b>, p. 79] 
By explicitly agreeing with Kautsky, it can be said that it also 
becomes Lenin's theory as well! Over time, particularly after 
Kautsky had been labelled a <i>"renegade"</i> by Lenin, Kautsky's 
star waned and Lenin's rose. Little wonder the argument became 
associated with Lenin rather than the discredited Kautsky. Draper 
then speculated that <i>"it is curious . . . that no one has sought 
to prove that by launching this theory . . . Kautsky was laying the 
basis for the demon of totalitarianism."</i> A simply reason exists
for this, namely the fact that Kautsky, unlike Lenin, was never
the head of a one-party dictatorship and justified this system
politically. Indeed, Kautsky attacked the Bolsheviks for this,
which caused Lenin to label him a <i>"renegade."</i> Kautsky, in this 
sense, can be considered as being inconsistent with his political 
assumptions, unlike Lenin who took these assumptions to their 
logical conclusions. 
</p><p>
How, after showing the obvious fact that <i>"the crucial 'Leninist' 
theory was really Kautsky's,"</i> he then wondered: <i>"Did Lenin, 
in <b>WITBD</b>, adopt Kautsky's theory?"</i> He answered his own question 
with an astounding <i>"Again, not exactly"</i>! Clearly, quoting 
approvingly of a theory and stating it is <i>"profoundly true"</i> 
does not, in fact, make you a supporter of it! What evidence 
does Draper present for his amazing answer? Well, Draper argued 
that Lenin <i>"tried to get maximum mileage out of it against the 
right wing; this was the point of his quoting it. If it did 
something for Kautsky's polemic, he no doubt figured that it 
would do something for his."</i> Or, to present a more simple and 
obvious explanation, Lenin <b>agreed</b> with Kautsky's <i>"profoundly 
true"</i> argument!
</p><p>
Aware of this possibility, Draper tried to combat it. <i>"Certainly,"</i> 
he argued, <i>"this young man Lenin was not (yet) so brash as to 
attack his 'pope' or correct him overtly. But there was obviously 
a feeling of discomfort. While showing some modesty and attempting 
to avoid the appearance of a head-on criticism, the fact is that 
Lenin inserted two longish footnotes rejecting (or if you wish, 
amending) precisely what was worst about the Kautsky theory on 
the role of the proletariat."</i> So, here we have Lenin quoting 
Kautsky to prove his own argument (and noting that Kautsky's 
words were <i>"profoundly true and important"</i>!) but <i>"feeling 
discomfort"</i> over what he has just approvingly quoted! Incredible!
</p><p>
So how does Lenin <i>"amend"</i> Kautsky's <i>"profoundly true and 
important"</i> argument? In two ways, according to Draper. 
Firstly, in a footnote which <i>"was appended right after 
the Kautsky passage"</i> Lenin quoted. Draper argued that 
it <i>"was specifically formulated to undermine and weaken 
the theoretical content of Kautsky's position. It began: 
'This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no 
part in creating such an ideology.' But this was exactly 
what Kautsky did mean and say. In the guise of offering 
a caution, Lenin was proposing a modified view. 'They 
[the workers] take part, however,' Lenin's footnote 
continued, 'not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians, 
as Proudhons and Weitlings; in other words, they take part 
only when they are able . . .' In short, Lenin was 
reminding the reader that Kautsky's sweeping statements 
were not even 100% true historically; he pointed to 
exceptions."</i> Yes, Lenin <b>did</b> point to exceptions <b>in 
order to refute objections to Kautsky's argument before 
they were raised</b>! It is clear that Lenin was <b>not</b> 
refuting Kautsky. Thus Proudhon adds to socialist ideology 
in so far as he is a <i>"socialist theoretician"</i> and not a 
worker! How clear can you be? This can be seen from the rest 
of the sentence Draper truncates. Lenin continued by noting 
that people like Proudhon <i>"take part only to the extent that 
they are able, more or less, to acquire the knowledge of their 
age and advance that knowledge."</i> {</p><p>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 82f] 
In other words, insofar as they learn from the <i>"vehicles 
of science."</i> Neither Kautsky or Lenin denied that it was 
possible for workers to acquire such knowledge and pass it on
(sometimes even develop it). However this does <b>not</b> mean
that they thought workers, as part of their daily life and
struggle <b>as workers,</b> could develop <i>"socialist theory."</i>
Thus Lenin's footnote reiterated Kautsky's argument rather
than, as Draper hoped, refute it.
</p><p>
Draper turns to another footnote, which he noted <i>"was not directly 
tied to the Kautsky article, but discussed the 'spontaneity' of the 
socialist idea. 'It is often said,' Lenin began, 'that the working 
class <b>spontaneously</b> gravitates towards socialism. This is 
perfectly true in the sense that socialist theory reveals the 
causes of the misery of the working class . . . and for that 
reason the workers are able to assimilate it so easily,' but he 
reminded that this process itself was not subordinated to mere 
spontaneity. 'The working class spontaneously gravitates towards 
socialism; nevertheless, . . . bourgeois ideology spontaneously 
imposes itself upon the working class to a still greater degree.'"</i> 
Draper argued that this <i>"was obviously written to modify and 
recast the Kautsky theory, without coming out and saying that 
the Master was wrong."</i> So, here we have Lenin approvingly quoting 
Kautsky in the main text while, at the same time, providing a 
footnote to show that, in fact, he did not agree with what he
has just quoted! Truly amazing - and easily refuted. 
</p><p>
Lenin's footnote stressed, in a part Draper did not consider it wise
to quote, that workers appreciate socialist theory <i>"<b>provided,</b> 
however, that this theory does not step aside for spontaneity and 
<b>provided</b> it subordinates spontaneity to itself."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 84f] In other words, workers <i>"assimilate"</i> 
socialist theory only when socialist theory does not adjust itself 
to the <i>"spontaneous"</i> forces at work in the class struggle. 
The workers adjust to socialist theory, they do not create it. Thus, 
rather than refuting Kautsky by the backdoor, Lenin in this footnote 
still agreed with him. Socialism does not develop, as Kautsky stressed, 
from the class struggle but rather has to be injected into it. This means,
by necessity, the party <i>"subordinates spontaneity to itself."</i>
</p><p>
Draper argued that this <i>"modification"</i> simply meant that there 
<i>"are several things that happen 'spontaneously,' and what will 
win out is not decided only by spontaneity"</i> but as can be seen,
this is not the case. Only when <i>"spontaneity"</i> is subordinated to
the theory (i.e. the party) can socialism be won, a totally 
different position. As such, when Draper asserted that <i>"[a]ll 
that was clear at this point was that Lenin was justifiably 
dissatisfied with the formulation of Kautsky's theory,"</i> he was 
simply expressing wishful thinking. This footnote, like the first 
one, continued the argument developed by Lenin in the main text 
and in no way is in contradiction to it. As is obvious.
</p><p>
Draper as final evidence of his case asserted that it <i>"is a curious 
fact that no one has ever found this alleged theory anywhere else 
in Lenin's voluminous writings, not before and not after [<b>WITBD</b>]. 
It never appeared in Lenin again. No Leninologist has ever quoted 
such a theory from any other place in Lenin."</i> However, as this 
theory was the orthodox Marxist position, Lenin had no real need to 
reiterate this argument continuously. After all, he had quoted the 
acknowledged leader of Marxism on the subject explicitly to show the 
orthodoxy of his argument and the non-Marxist base of those
he argued against. Once the debate had been won and orthodox Marxism 
triumphant, why repeat the argument again? This, as we will see, was 
exactly the position Lenin <b>did</b> take in 1907 when he wrote an 
introduction to a book which contained <b>What is to Be Done?</b>.
</p><p>
In contradiction to Draper's claim, Lenin <b>did</b> return to this 
matter. In October 1905 he wrote an a short article in praise of an 
article by Stalin on this very subject. Stalin had sought to explain 
Lenin's ideas to the Georgian Social-Democracy and, like Lenin, had 
sought to root the argument in Marxist orthodoxy (partly to justify 
the argument, partly to expose the Menshevik opposition as being 
non-Marxists). Stalin argued along similar lines to Lenin:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"the question now is: who works out, who is able to work out
this socialist consciousness (i.e. scientific socialism)? 
Kautsky says, and I repeat his idea, that the masses of 
proletarians, as long as they remain proletarians, have
neither the time nor the opportunity to work out socialist
consciousness . . . The vehicles of science are the 
intellectuals . . . who have both the time and opportunity
to put themselves in the van of science and workout socialist
consciousness. Clearly, socialist consciousness is worked
out by a few Social-Democratic intellectuals who posses the
time and opportunity to do so."</i> [<b>Collected Works</b>, vol. 1,
p. 164]
</blockquote></p><p>
Stalin stressed the Marxist orthodoxy by stating Social-Democracy
<i>"comes in and introduces socialist consciousness into the working 
class movement. This is what Kautsky has in mind when he says 
'socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian 
class struggle from without.'"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 164-5]
That Stalin was simply repeating Lenin's and Kautsky's arguments
is clear, as is the fact it was considered the orthodox position
within social-democracy.
</p><p>
If Draper was right, then Lenin would have taken the opportunity
to attack Stalin's article and express the alternative viewpoint
Draper was convinced he held. Lenin, however, put pen to paper to
<b>praise</b> Stalin's work, noting <i>"the splendid way in which the
problem of the celebrated 'introduction of a consciousness from 
without' had been posed."</i> Lenin explicitly agreed with Stalin's
summary of his argument, writing that <i>"social being determines 
consciousness . . . Socialist consciousness corresponds to the
position of the proletariat"</i> before quoting Stalin: <i>"'Who can
and does evolve this consciousness (scientific socialism)?'"</i> He
answers by again approvingly quoting Stalin: <i>"its 'evolution' is 
a matter for a few Social-Democratic intellectuals who posses the 
necessary means and time.'"</i> Lenin did argue that Social-Democracy 
meets <i>"an instinctive <b>urge</b> towards socialism"</i> when it 
<i>"comes to the proletariat with the message of socialism,"</i> 
but this does not counter the main argument that the working class 
cannot develop socialist consciousness by it own efforts and the, 
by necessity, elitist and hierarchical politics that flow from 
this position. [Lenin, <b>Collected Works</b>, vol. 9, p. 388] 
</p><p>
That Lenin did not reject his early formulations can also be 
seen from in his introduction to the pamphlet <i>"Twelve Years"</i> 
which contained <b>What is to be Done?</b>. Rather than explaining 
the false nature of that work's more infamous arguments, Lenin 
in fact defended them. For example, as regards the question 
of professional revolutionaries, he argued that the statements 
of his opponents now <i>"look ridiculous"</i> as <i>"<b>today</b> 
the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries has
<b>already</b> scored a complete victory,"</i> a victory which 
<i>"would have been impossible if this idea had not been pushed to 
the <b>forefront</b> at the time."</i> He noted that his work had 
<i>"vanquished Economism . . . and finally <b>created</b> this
organisation."</i> On the question of socialist consciousness, 
he simply reiterated the Marxist orthodoxy of his position, 
noting that its <i>"formulation of the relationship between 
spontaneity and political consciousness was agreed upon by 
all the <b>Iskra</b> editors . . . Consequently, there could be 
no question of any difference in principle between the draft 
Party programme and <b>What is to be Done?</b> on this issue."</i> So
while Lenin argued that his book <i>"straightens out what had
been twisted by the Economists,"</i> (who had <i>"gone to one 
extreme"</i>) he did not correct his earlier arguments. 
[<b>Collected Works</b>, vol. 13, p. 101, p. 102 and p. 107]
</p><p>
Looking at Lenin's arguments at the Communist International on
the question of the party we see an obvious return to the ideas
of <b>WITBD</b> (see <a href="secH5.html#sech55">section H.5.5</a>). 
Here was have a similar legal/illegal duality, strict centralism, 
strong hierarchy and the vision of the party as the <i>"head"</i> 
of the working class (i.e. its consciousness). In <b>Left-Wing 
Communism</b>, Lenin mocks those who reject the idea that 
dictatorship by the party is the same as that of the class 
(see <a href="secH3.html#sech33">section H.3.3</a>).  
</p><p>
For Draper, the key problem was that critics of Lenin <i>"run two 
different questions together: (a) What was, historically, the 
<b>initial</b> role of intellectuals in the beginnings of the 
socialist movement, and (b) what <b>is</b> - and above all, what 
should be - the role of bourgeois intellectuals in a working-class 
party today."</i> He argued that Kautsky did not believe that 
<i>"<b>if</b> it can be shown that intellectuals historically 
played a certain initiatory role, they <b>must</b> and <b>should</b> 
continue to play the same role now and forever. It does not follow; 
as the working class matured, it tended to throw off leading strings."</i> 
However, this is unconvincing. If socialist consciousness cannot
be generated by the working class by its own struggles then this
is applicable now and in the future. Thus workers who join the
socialist movement will be repeating the party ideology, as 
developed by intellectuals in the past. If they <b>do</b> develop
new theory, it would be, as Lenin stressed, <i>"not as workers,
but as socialist theoreticians"</i> and so socialist consciousness
still does not derive from their own class experiences. This
places the party in a privileged position vis-à-vis the working
class and so the elitism remains.
</p><p>
Somewhat ironically given how much Draper is at pains to distance his
hero Lenin from claims of elitism, he himself <b>agreed</b> with the
arguments of Kautsky and Lenin. For Draper socialism did <b>not</b> 
develop out of the class struggle: <i>"As a matter of fact, in the 
International of 1902 no one really had any doubts about the historical 
facts concerning the beginnings of the movement."</i> This was true.
Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, made similar arguments to 
Kautsky's before Lenin put pen to paper. For Plekhanov, the socialist 
intelligentsia <i>"will bring <b>consciousness</b> into the working 
class."</i> It must <i>"become the leader of the working class"</i> 
and <i>"explain to it its political and economic interests."</i> 
This would <i>"prepare them to play an independent role in the 
social life of Russia."</i> [quoted by Neil Harding, <b>Lenin's 
Political Thought</b>, vol. 1, p. 50 and  p. 51] 
</p><p>
As one expert notes, <i>"Lenin's position . . . did not differ in 
any essentials"</i> from those <i>"Plekhanov had himself expressed."</i> 
Its <i>"basic theses were his own"</i>, namely that it is <i>"clear 
from Plekhanov's writing that it was the intelligentsia which virtually 
created the working class movement in its conscious form. It brought 
it science, revolutionary theory and organisation."</i> In summary, 
<i>"Lenin's views of the Party . . . are not to be regarded as 
extraordinary, innovatory, perverse, essentially Jacobin or unorthodox. 
On the contrary"</i> they were <i>"the touchstone of orthodoxy"</i> and 
so <i>"what it [<b>What is to be Done?</b>] presented at the time"</i> 
was <i>"a restatement of the principles of Russian Marxist orthodoxy."</i> 
By quoting Kautsky, Lenin also proved that he was simply repeating the 
general Marxist orthodoxy: <i>"Those who dispute Lenin's conclusions on 
the genesis of socialist consciousness must it seems, also dispute 
Kautsky's claim to represent Social-Democratic orthodoxy."</i> [Harding, 
<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 170, p. 172, pp. 50-1, p. 187, p. 188, p. 189 and 
p. 169]
</p><p>
Moreover, Engels wrote some interesting words in the 1840s on this
issue which places the subsequent development of Marxism into sharper 
light. He noted that <i>"it is evident that the working-men's movement 
is divided into two sections, the Chartists and the Socialists. The 
Chartists are theoretically the more backward, the less developed, 
but they are genuine proletarians . . . The Socialists are more 
far-seeing . . . but proceeding originally from the bourgeoisie, 
are for this reason unable to amalgamate completely with the working 
class. The union of Socialism with Chartism . . . will be the next step 
. . . Then, only when this has been achieved, will the working class be 
the true intellectual leader of England."</i> Thus socialist ideas have 
to be introduced into the proletariat, as they are <i>"more backward"</i> 
and cannot be expected to develop theory for themselves! In the same year, 
he expounded on what this <i>"union"</i> would entail, writing in an 
Owenite paper that <i>"the union between the German philosophers . . . 
and the German working men . . . is all but accomplished. With the 
philosophers to think, and the working mean to fight for us, will any 
earthly power be strong enough to resist our progress?"</i> [<b>Collected 
Works</b>, vol. 4, pp. 526-7 and p. 236] This, of course, fits in with
the <b>Communist Manifesto</b>'s assertion that <i>"a small section of 
the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class."</i>
Today, this <i>"portion of the bourgeois ideologists"</i> have <i>"raised 
themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical 
movement as a whole."</i> [<b>The Marx-Engels Reader</b>, p. 481] This,
needless to say, places <i>"bourgeois ideologists"</i> (like Marx, Engels, 
Kautsky and Lenin) in a privileged position within the movement and has
distinctly vanguardist undercurrents.
</p><p>
Seemingly unaware how this admission destroyed his case, Draper went on to
ask: <i>"But what followed from those facts?"</i> To which he argued that 
Marx and Engels <i>"concluded, from the same facts and subsequent 
experiences, that the movement had to be sternly warned against the 
influence of bourgeois intellectuals inside the party."</i> (We wonder 
if Marx and Engels included themselves in the list of <i>"bourgeois 
intellectuals"</i> the workers had to be <i>"sternly warned"</i> about?) 
Thus, amusingly enough, Draper argued that Marx, Engels, Kautsky and 
Lenin all held to the <i>"same facts"</i> that socialist consciousness 
developed outside the experiences of the working classes! 
</p><p>
Ultimately, the whole rationale for the kind of wishful thinking
that Draper inflicted on us is flawed. As noted above, you do not 
combat what you think is an incorrect position with one which
you consider as also being wrong or do not agree with! You 
counter what you consider as an incorrect position with one
you consider correct and agree with. As Lenin, in <b>WITBD</b>, 
explicitly did. This means that later attempts by his followers 
to downplay the ideas raised in Lenin's book are unconvincing. 
Moreover, as he was simply repeating Social-Democratic orthodoxy 
it seems doubly unconvincing. 
</p><p>
Clearly, Draper was wrong. Lenin did, as indicated above, actually meant 
what he said in <b>WITBD</b>. The fact that Lenin quoted Kautsky simply 
shows, as Lenin intended, that this position was the orthodox Social
Democratic one, held by the mainstream of the party (one with roots in 
Marx and Engels). Given that Leninism was (and still is) a "radical" 
offshoot of this movement, this should come as no surprise. However, 
Draper's comments remind us how religious many forms of Marxism are - 
why do we need facts when we have the true faith?</p>

<a name="sech55"><h2>H.5.5 What is <i>"democratic centralism"</i>?</h2></a>

<p>
Anarchists oppose vanguardism for three reasons, one of which is the 
way it recommends how revolutionaries should organise to influence the 
class struggle.
</p><p>
So how is a "vanguard" party organised? To quote the Communist
International's 1920 resolution on the role of the Communist 
Party in the revolution, the party must have a <i>"centralised 
political apparatus"</i> and <i>"must be organised on the basis of 
iron proletarian centralism."</i> This, of course, suggests a 
top-down structure internally, which the resolution explicitly
calls for. In its words, <i>"Communist cells of every kind must be 
subordinate to one another as precisely as possible in a strict 
hierarchy."</i> [<b>Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress 
1920</b>, vol. 1, p. 193, p. 198 and p. 199] Therefore, the vanguard 
party is organised in a centralised, top-down way. However, this 
is not all, as well as being <i>"centralised,"</i> the party is also meant
to be democratic, hence the expression <i>"democratic centralism."</i>
On this the resolution states:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The Communist Party must be organised on the basis of democratic 
centralism. The most important principle of democratic centralism 
is election of the higher party organs by the lowest, the fact 
that all instructions by a superior body are unconditionally and 
necessarily binding on lower ones, and existence of a strong 
central party leadership whose authority over all leading party
comrades in the period between one party congress and the next 
is universally accepted."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 198]
</blockquote></p><p>
For Lenin, speaking in the same year, democratic centralism meant
<i>"only that representatives from the localities meet and elect a
responsible body which must then govern . . . Democratic centralism
consists in the Congress checking on the Central Committee, removing 
it and electing a new one."</i> [quoted by Robert Service, <b>The 
Bolshevik Party in Revolution</b>, p. 131] Thus, <i>"democratic 
centralism"</i> is inherently top-down, although the <i>"higher"</i> 
party organs are, in principle, elected by the <i>"lower."</i> However, 
the key point is that the central committee is the active element, the 
one whose decisions are implemented and so the focus of the structure 
is in the <i>"centralism"</i> rather than the <i>"democratic"</i> part 
of the formula.
</p><p>
As we noted in <a href="secH2.html#sech214">section H.2.14</a>, 
the Communist Party was expected to have a dual structure, one legal 
and the other illegal. It goes without saying that the illegal 
structure is the real power in the party and that it cannot be 
expected to be as democratic as the legal party, which in turn 
would be less than democratic as the illegal would have the real
power within the organisation.
</p><p>
All this has clear parallels with Lenin's <b>What is to be done?</b>, 
where he argued for <i>"a powerful and strictly secret organisation, 
which concentrates in its hands all the threads of secret activities, 
an organisation which of necessity must be a centralised organisation."</i> 
This call for centralisation is not totally dependent on secrecy, 
though. As he noted, <i>"specialisation necessarily presupposes 
centralisation, and in its turn imperatively calls for it."</i> Such 
a centralised organisation would need leaders and Lenin argued that 
<i>"no movement can be durable without a stable organisation of 
leaders to maintain continuity."</i> As such, <i>"the organisation 
must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolutionary activities 
as a profession."</i> Thus, we have a centralised organisation which 
is managed by specialists, by <i>"professional revolutionaries."</i> 
This does not mean that these all come from the bourgeoisie or petit 
bourgeoisie. According to Lenin a <i>"workingman agitator who is at 
all talented and 'promising' <b>must not be left</b> to work eleven 
hours a day in a factory. We must arrange that he be maintained by 
the Party, that he may in due time go underground."</i> [<b>Essential 
Works of Lenin</b>, p. 158, p. 153, p. 147, p. 148 and p. 155]
</blockquote></p><p>
Thus the full time professional revolutionaries are drawn from 
all classes into the party apparatus. However, in practice
the majority of such full-timers were/are middle class. Trotsky 
noted that <i>"just as in the Bolshevik committees, so at the 
[1905] Congress itself, there were almost no workingmen. The
intellectuals predominated."</i> [<b>Stalin</b>, vol. 1, p. 101] 
This did not change, even after the influx of working class members
in 1917 the <i>"incidence of middle-class activists increases at 
the highest echelons of the hierarchy of executive committees."</i> 
[Robert Service, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 47] An ex-worker was a rare 
sight in the Bolshevik Central Committee, an actual worker 
non-existent. However, regardless of their original class 
background what unites the full-timers is not their origin 
but rather their current relationship with the working class, 
one of separation and hierarchy. 
</p><p>
The organisational structure of this system was made clear 
at around the same time as <b>What is to be Done?</b>, with 
Lenin arguing that the factory group (or cell) of the 
party <i>"must consist of a small number of <b>revolutionaries,</b> 
receiving <b>direct from the [central] committee</b> orders and 
power to conduct the whole social-democratic work in the 
factory. All members of the factory committee must regard 
themselves as agents of the [central] committee, bound to 
submit to all its directions, bound to observe all 'laws 
and customs' of this 'army in the field' in which they
have entered and which they cannot leave without permission
of the commander."</i> [quoted by E.H. Carr, <b>The Bolshevik 
Revolution</b>, vol. 1, p. 33] The similarities to the structure
proposed by Lenin and agreed to by the Comintern in 1920 is
obvious. Thus we have a highly centralised party, one run by 
<i>"professional revolutionaries"</i> from the top down. 
</p><p>
It will be objected that Lenin was discussing the means of 
party building under Tsarism and advocated wider democracy
under legality. However, given that in 1920 he universalised
the Bolshevik experience and urged the creation of a dual
party structure (based on legal and illegal structures), his 
comments on centralisation are applicable to vanguardism in 
general. Moreover, in 1902 he based his argument on experiences
drawn from democratic capitalist regimes. As he argued, <i>"no 
revolutionary organisation has ever practised <b>broad</b> 
democracy, nor could it, however much it desired to do so."</i> 
This was not considered as just applicable in Russia under the 
Tsar as Lenin then goes on to quote the Webb's <i>"book on trade 
unionism"</i> in order to clarify what he calls <i>"the confusion of
ideas concerning the meaning of democracy."</i> He noted that 
<i>"in the first period of existence in their unions, the 
British workers thought it was an indispensable sign of 
democracy for all members to do all the work of managing the
unions."</i> This involved <i>"all questions [being] decided by the
votes of all the members"</i> and all <i>"official duties"</i> being
<i>"fulfilled by all the members in turn."</i> He dismissed <i>"such
a conception of democracy"</i> as <i>"absurd"</i> and <i>"historical 
experience"</i> made them <i>"understand the necessity for 
representative institutions"</i> and <i>"full-time professional 
officials."</i> [<b>Essential Works of Lenin</b>, p. 161 and pp. 162-3]
</p><p>
Needless to say, Lenin linked this to Kautsky, who <i>"shows the 
need for <b>professional</b> journalists, parliamentarians, etc., 
for the Social-Democratic leadership of the proletarian class 
struggle"</i> and who <i>"attacks the 'socialism of anarchists and 
<b>litterateurs</b>' who . . . proclaim the principle that laws 
should be passed directly by the whole people, completely failing 
to understand that in modern society this principle can have only 
a relative application."</i> The universal nature of his dismissal 
of self-management within the revolutionary organisation in favour of 
representative forms is thus stressed. Significantly, Lenin stated 
that this <i>"'primitive' conception of democracy"</i> exists in 
two groups, the <i>"masses of the students and workers"</i> and the 
<i>"Economists of the Bernstein persuasion"</i> (i.e. reformists). 
Thus the idea of directly democratic working class organisations 
is associated with opportunism. He was generous, noting that he 
<i>"would not, of course, . . . condemn practical workers who have 
had too few opportunities for studying the theory and practice of 
real democratic [sic!] organisation"</i> but individuals <i>"play[ing] 
a leading role"</i> in the movement should be so condemned! 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 163] These people should know better! Thus 
<i>"real"</i> democratic organisation implies the restriction of 
democracy to that of electing leaders and any attempt to widen the 
input of ordinary members is simply an expression of workers who 
need educating from their <i>"primitive"</i> failings! 
</p><p>
In summary, we have a model of a <i>"revolutionary"</i> party which is
based on full-time <i>"professional revolutionaries"</i> in which the
concept of direct democracy is replaced by a system of, at
best, representative democracy. It is highly centralised, as
befitting a specialised organisation. As noted in 
<a href="secH3.html#sech33">section H.3.3</a>,
the <i>"organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy"</i> 
was <i>"to proceed from the top downward"</i> rather than <i>"from the 
bottom upward."</i> [Lenin, <b>Collected Works</b>, vol. 7, pp. 396-7]
Rather than being only applicable in Tsarist Russia, Lenin 
drew on examples from advanced, democratic capitalist countries
to justify his model in 1902 and in 1920 he advocated a similar
hierarchical and top-down organisation with a dual secret and 
public organisation in the <b>Communist International</b>. The
continuity of ideas is clear.</p>

<a name="sech56"><h2>H.5.6 Why do anarchists oppose <i>"democratic centralism"</i>?</h2></a>

<p>
What to make of Lenin's suggested model of <i>"democratic 
centralism"</i> discussed in the 
<a href="secH5.html#sech55">last section</a>? It is, to use 
Cornelius Castoriadis's term, a <i>"revolutionary party 
organised on a capitalist manner"</i> and so in practice 
the <i>"democratic centralist"</i> party, while being 
centralised, will not be very democratic. In fact, the 
level of democracy would reflect that in a capitalist 
republic rather than a socialist society:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The dividing up of tasks, which is indispensable wherever there
is a need for co-operation, becomes a real division of labour, 
the labour of giving orders being separate from that of carrying
them out . . . this division between directors and executants 
tends to broaden and deepen by itself. The leaders specialise 
in their role and become indispensable while those who carry 
out orders become absorbed in their concrete tasks. Deprived 
of information, of the general view of the situation, and of 
the problems of organisation, arrested in their development by
their lack of participation in the overall life of the Party, 
the organisation's rank-and-file militants less and less have 
the means or the possibility of having any control over those at
the top.
</p><p>
"This division of labour is supposed to be limited by 'democracy.'
But democracy, which should mean that <b>the majority rules,</b> is 
reduced to meaning that the majority <b>designates its rulers;</b>
copied in this way from the model of bourgeois parliamentary
democracy, drained of any real meaning, it quickly becomes a 
veil thrown over the unlimited power of the rulers. The base
does not run the organisation just because once a year it elects
delegates who designate the central committee, no more than the
people are sovereign in a parliamentary-type republic because
they periodically elect deputies who designate the government.
</p><p>
"Let us consider, for example, 'democratic centralism' as it 
is supposed to function in an ideal Leninist party. That the 
central committee is designated by a 'democratically elected' 
congress makes no difference since, once it is elected, it 
has complete (statutory) control over the body of the Party
(and can dissolve the base organisations, kick out militants,
etc.) or that, under such conditions, it can determine the
composition of the next congress. The central committee 
could use its powers in an honourable way, these powers
could be reduced; the members of the Party might enjoy 
'political rights' such as being able to form factions, 
etc. Fundamentally this would not change the situation, 
for the central committee would still remain the organ 
that defines the political line of the organisation and
controls its application from top to bottom, that, in a
word, has permanent monopoly on the job of leadership. The
expression of opinions only has a limited value once the 
way the group functions prevents this opinion from forming 
on solid bases, i.e. permanent <b>participation</b> in the 
organisation's activities and in the solution of problems
that arise. If the way the organisation is run makes the 
solution of general problems the specific task and permanent 
work of a separate category of militants, only their opinion
will, or will appear, to count to the others."</i> [Castoriadis, 
<b>Social and Political Writings</b>, vol. 2, pp. 204-5]
</blockquote></p><p>
Castoriadis' insight is important and strikes at the heart of
the problem with vanguard parties. They simply reflect the 
capitalist society they claim to represent. As such, Lenin's
argument against <i>"primitive"</i> democracy in the revolutionary 
and labour movements is significant. When he asserts that 
those who argue for direct democracy <i>"completely"</i> fail to 
<i>"understand that in modern society this principle can have 
only a relative application,"</i> he is letting the cat out of 
the bag. [Lenin, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 163] After all, <i>"modern society"</i> 
is capitalism, a class society. In such a society, it is 
understandable that self-management should not be applied 
as it strikes at the heart of class society and how it 
operates. That Lenin can appeal to <i>"modern society"</i> without
recognising its class basis says a lot. The question becomes, 
if such a <i>"principle"</i> is valid for a class system, is it 
applicable in a socialist society and in the movement aiming to 
create such a society? Can we postpone the application of our 
ideas until <i>"after the revolution"</i> or can the revolution 
only occur when we apply our socialist principles in resisting 
class society?
</p><p>
In a nutshell, can the same set of organisational structures 
be used for the different ends? Can bourgeois structures be
considered neutral or have they, in fact, evolved to ensure and 
protect minority rule? Ultimately, form and content are not 
independent of each other. Form and content adapt to fit each 
other and they cannot be divorced in reality. Thus, if the 
bourgeoisie embrace centralisation and representation they have
done so because it fits perfectly with their specific form of
class society. Neither centralisation and representation can 
undermine minority rule and, if they did, they would quickly be
eliminated. 
</p><p>
Interestingly, both Bukharin and Trotsky acknowledged that 
fascism had appropriated Bolshevik ideas. The former demonstrated 
at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party in 1923 how Italian 
fascism had <i>"adopted and applied in practice the experiences of 
the Russian revolution"</i> in terms of their <i>"methods of combat."</i> In 
fact, <i>"[i]f one regards them from the <b>formal</b> point of view, that 
is, from the point of view of the technique of their political
methods, then one discovers in them a complete application of 
Bolshevik tactics. . . in the sense of the rapid concentration of 
forced [and] energetic action of a tightly structured military 
organisation."</i> [quoted by R. Pipes, <b>Russia Under the Bolshevik 
Regime, 1919-1924</b>, p. 253] The latter, in his uncompleted 
biography on Stalin noted that <i>"Mussolini stole from the 
Bolsheviks . . . Hitler imitated the Bolsheviks and Mussolini."</i> 
[<b>Stalin</b>, vol. 2, p. 243] The question arises as to whether the 
same tactics and structures serve both the needs of fascist 
reaction <b>and</b> socialist revolution? Now, if Bolshevism can 
serve as a model for fascism, it must contain structural and 
functional elements which are also common to fascism. After 
all, no one has detected a tendency of Hitler or Mussolini, in 
their crusade against democracy, the organised labour movement 
and the left, to imitate the organisational principles of 
anarchism.
</p><p>
Surely we can expect decisive structural differences 
to exist between capitalism and socialism if these societies 
are to have different aims. Where one is centralised to 
facilitate minority rule, the other must be decentralised and 
federal to facilitate mass participation. Where one is top-down, 
the other must be from the bottom-up. If a <i>"socialism"</i> exists 
which uses bourgeois organisational elements then we should not 
be surprised if it turns out to be socialist in name only. The 
same applies to revolutionary organisations. As the anarchists 
of <b>Trotwatch</b> explain:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"In reality, a Leninist Party simply reproduces and 
institutionalises existing capitalist power relations
inside a supposedly 'revolutionary' organisation: 
between leaders and led; order givers and order takers;
between specialists and the acquiescent and largely
powerless party workers. And that elitist power relation 
is extended to include the relationship between the party 
and class."</i> [<b>Carry on Recruiting!</b>, p. 41]
</blockquote></p><p>
If you have an organisation which celebrates centralisation,
having an institutionalised <i>"leadership"</i> separate from the
mass of members becomes inevitable. Thus the division of 
labour which exists in the capitalist workplace or state is
created. Forms cannot and do not exist independently of 
people and so imply specific forms of social relationships 
within them. These social relationships shape those subject 
to them. Can we expect the same forms of authority to have 
different impacts simply because the organisation has 
<i>"socialist"</i> or <i>"revolutionary"</i> in its name? Of course not.
It is for this reason that anarchists argue that only in
a <i>"libertarian socialist movement the workers learn about
non-dominating forms of association through creating and
experimenting with forms such as libertarian labour 
organisations, which put into practice, through struggle
against exploitation, principles of equality and free
association."</i> [John Clark, <b>The Anarchist Moment</b>, p. 79]
</p><p>
As noted above, a <i>"democratic centralist"</i> party requires that
the <i>"lower"</i> party bodies (cells, branches, etc.) should be
subordinate to the higher ones (e.g. the central committee).
The higher bodies are elected at the (usually) annual 
conference. As it is impossible to mandate for future 
developments, the higher bodies therefore are given 
carte blanche to determine policy which is binding on the
whole party (hence the <i>"from top-down"</i> principle). In between
conferences, the job of full time (ideally elected, but not
always) officers is to lead the party and carry out the 
policy decided by the central committee. At the next 
conference, the party membership can show its approval of
the leadership by electing another. The problems with this
scheme are numerous:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The first problem is the issue of hierarchy. Why should 
'higher' party organs interpret party policy any more 
accurately than 'lower' ones? The pat answer is that the
'higher' bodies compromise the most capable and experienced
members and are (from their lofty heights) in a better 
position to take an overall view on a given issue. In fact
what may well happen is that, for example, central committee
members may be more isolated from the outside world than 
mere branch members. This might ordinarily be the case 
because given the fact than many central committee members
are full timers and therefore detached from more real issues
such as making a living . . ."</i> [ACF, <b>Marxism and its 
Failures</b>, p. 8]
</blockquote></p><p>
Equally, in order that the <i>"higher"</i> bodies can evaluate the 
situation they need effective information from the <i>"lower"</i>
bodies. If the <i>"lower"</i> bodies are deemed incapable of formulating
their own policies, how can they be wise enough, firstly, to
select the right leaders and, secondly, determine the appropriate
information to communicate to the <i>"higher"</i> bodies? Given 
the assumptions for centralised power in the party, can we not 
see that <i>"democratic centralised"</i> parties will be 
extremely inefficient in practice as information and knowledge
is lost in the party machine and whatever decisions which are
reached at the top are made in ignorance of the real situation
on the ground? As we discuss in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech58">section H.5.8</a>, this is usually
the fate of such parties.
</p><p>
Within the party, as noted, the role of <i>"professional revolutionaries"</i>
(or <i>"full timers"</i>) is stressed. As Lenin argued, any worker which
showed any talent must be removed from the workplace and become a
party functionary. Is it surprising that the few Bolshevik cadres 
(i.e. professional revolutionaries) of working class origin soon 
lost real contact with the working class? Equally, what will their
role <b>within</b> the party be? As we discuss in 
<a href="sech5.html#sech512">section H.5.12</a>, 
their role in the Bolshevik party was essentially conservative in
nature and aimed to maintain their own position.
</p><p>
That the anarchist critique of <i>"democratic centralism"</i> is valid,
we need only point to the comments and analysis of numerous 
members (and often soon to be ex-members) of such parties. Thus
we get a continual stream of articles discussing why specific
parties are, in fact, <i>"bureaucratic centralist"</i> rather than 
"democratic centralist"</i> and what is required to reform them. 
That every <i>"democratic centralist"</i> party in existence is
not that democratic does not hinder their attempts to create one
which is. In a way, the truly <i>"democratic centralist"</i> party is
the Holy Grail of modern Leninism. As we discuss in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech510">section H.5.10</a>, 
their goal may be as mythical as that of the Arthurian 
legends.</p>

<a name="sech57"><h2>H.5.7 Is the way revolutionaries organise important?</h2></a>

<p>
As we discussed in the 
<a href="secH5.html#sech56">last section</a>, anarchists argue that
the way revolutionaries organise today is important. However, 
according to some of Lenin's followers, the fact that the 
"revolutionary" party is organised in a non-revolutionary 
manner does not matter. In the words of Chris Harman, a leading 
member of the British <b>Socialist Workers Party</b>, <i>"[e]xisting 
under capitalism, the revolutionary organisation [i.e. the 
vanguard party] will of necessity have a quite different 
structure to that of the workers' state that will arise in 
the process of overthrowing capitalism."</i> [<b>Party and Class</b>, 
p. 34]
</p><p>
However, in practice this distinction is impossible to make. If the 
party is organised in specific ways then it is so because this is 
conceived to be <i>"efficient,"</i> <i>"practical"</i> and so on. 
Hence we find Lenin arguing against <i>"backwardness in organisation"</i> 
and that the <i>"point at issue is whether our ideological struggle is 
to have <b>forms of a higher type</b> to clothe it, forms of Party 
organisation binding on all."</i> Why would the "workers' state" be 
based on "backward" or "lower" kinds of organisational forms? If, as 
Lenin remarked, <i>"the organisational principle of revolutionary 
Social-Democracy"</i> was <i>"to proceed from the top downward"</i>, 
why would the party, once in power, reject its <i>"organisational 
principle"</i> in favour of one it thinks is <i>"opportunist,"</i> 
<i>"primitive"</i> and so on? [<b>Collected Works</b>, vol. 7, p. 389, 
p. 388 and pp. 396-7]
</p><p>
Therefore, as the <b>vanguard</b> the party represents the level 
to which the working class is supposed to reach then its
organisational principles must, similarly, be those which
the class must reach. As such, Harman's comments are 
incredulous. How we organise today is hardly irrelevant, 
particularly if the revolutionary organisation in question 
seeks (to use Lenin's words) to <i>"tak[e] full state power 
alone."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, vol. 26, p. 94] These prejudices 
(and the political and organisational habits they generate) 
will influence the shaping of the <i>"workers' state"</i> by the 
party once it has taken power. This decisive influence of 
the party and its ideological as well as organisational 
assumptions can be seen when Trotsky argued in 1923 that 
<i>"the party created the state apparatus and can rebuild it 
anew . . . from the party you get the state, but not the 
party from the state."</i> [<b>Leon Trotsky Speaks</b>, p. 161] This 
is to be expected, after all the aim of the party is to take, 
hold and execute power. Given that the vanguard party is 
organised as it is to ensure effectiveness and efficiency, 
why should we assume that the ruling party will not seek to 
recreate these organisational principles once in power? As
the Russian Revolution proves, this is the case (see <a href="secH6.html">section H.6</a>)
</p><p>
To claim how we organise under capitalism is not important to a 
revolutionary movement is simply not true. The way revolutionaries 
organise have an impact both on themselves and how they will view 
the revolution developing. An ideological prejudice for centralisation 
and "top-down" organisation will not disappear once the revolution starts.
Rather, it will influence the way the party acts within it and, if it aims 
to seize power, how it will exercise that power once it has.
</p><p>
For these reasons anarchists stress the importance of building
the new world in the shell of the old (see <a href="secH1.html#sech16">section H.1.6</a>). 
All organisations create social relationships which shape their memberships. 
As the members of these parties will be part of the revolutionary process, 
they will influence how that revolution will develop and any "transitional" 
institutions which are created. As the aim of such organisations is to 
facilitate the creation of socialism, the obvious implication 
is that the revolutionary organisation must, itself, reflect 
the society it is trying to create. Clearly, then, the idea that 
how we organise as revolutionaries today can be considered somehow 
independent of the revolutionary process and the nature of 
post-capitalist society and its institutions cannot be maintained 
(particularly if the aim of the <i>"revolutionary"</i> organisation is 
to seize power on behalf of the working class).
</p><p>
As we argue elsewhere (see <a href="secJ3.html">section J.3</a>) anarchists 
argue for revolutionary groups based on self-management, federalism and
decision making from below. In other words, we apply within our
organisations the same principles as those which the working 
class has evolved in the course of its own struggles. Autonomy 
is combined with federalism, so ensuring co-ordination of decisions 
and activities is achieved from below upwards by means of mandated
and recallable delegates. Effective co-operation is achieved as 
it is informed by and reflects the needs on the ground. Simply 
put, working class organisation and discipline - as exemplified
by the workers' council or strike committee - represents a 
completely different thing from <b>capitalist</b> organisation and
discipline, of which Leninists are constantly asking for more
(albeit draped with the Red Flag and labelled <i>"revolutionary"</i>).
And as we discuss in the 
<a href="secH5.html#sech58">next section</a>, the Leninist model of 
top-down centralised parties is marked more by its failures 
than its successes, suggesting that not only is the vanguard 
model undesirable, it is also unnecessary.</p>

<a name="sech58"><h2>H.5.8 Are vanguard parties effective?</h2></a>

<p>
In a word, no. Vanguard parties have rarely been proven to be
effective organs for fermenting revolutionary change which is,
let us not forget, their stated purpose. Indeed, rather than
being in the vanguard of social struggle, the Leninist parties
are often the last to recognise, let alone understand, the 
initial stirrings of important social movements and events.
It is only once these movements have exploded in the streets
that the self-proclaimed "vanguards" notice them and decide 
they require the party's leadership. 
</p><p>
Part of this process are constant attempts to install their 
political program onto movements that they do not understand, 
movements that have proven to be successful using different 
tactics and methods of organisation. Rather than learn from 
the experiences of others, social movements are seen as raw
material, as a source of new party members, to be used in order
to advance the party rather than the autonomy and combativeness
of the working class. This process was seen in the <i>"anti-globalisation"</i> 
or <i>"anti-capitalist"</i> movement at the end of the 20th century.
This started without the help of these self-appointed vanguards, who
once it appeared spent a lot of time trying to catch up with the 
movement while criticising its proven organisational principles
and tactics.
</p><p>
The reasons for such behaviour are not too difficult to find. They
lie in the organisational structure favoured by these parties and the
mentality lying behind them. As anarchists have long argued, a 
centralised, top-down structure will simply be unresponsive to 
the needs of those in struggle. The inertia associated with the
party hierarchy will ensure that it responds slowly to new 
developments and its centralised structure means that the 
leadership is isolated from what is happening on the ground 
and cannot respond appropriately. The underlying assumption of
the vanguard party, namely that the party represents the interests
of the working class, makes it unresponsive to new developments 
within the class struggle. As Lenin argued that spontaneous 
working class struggle tends to reformism, the leaders of a 
vanguard party automatically are suspicious of new developments
which, by their very nature, rarely fit into previously agreed
models of <i>"proletarian"</i> struggle. The example of Bolshevik 
hostility to the soviets spontaneously formed by workers during 
the 1905 Russian revolution is one of the best known examples of
this tendency.
</p><p>
Murray Bookchin is worth quoting at length on this subject:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The 'glorious party,' when there is one, almost invariably lags 
behind the events . . . In the beginning . . . it tends to have an 
inhibitory function, not a 'vanguard' role. Where it exercises 
influence, it tends to slow down the flow of events, not 'co-
ordinate' the revolutionary forces. This is not accidental. The 
party is structured along hierarchical lines <b>that reflect the very 
society it professes to oppose.</b> Despite its theoretical pretensions,
it is a bourgeois organism, a miniature state, with an apparatus
and a cadre whose function it is to <b>seize</b> power, not <b>dissolve</b>
power. Rooted in the pre-revolutionary period, it assimilates all
the forms, techniques and mentality of bureaucracy. Its membership 
is schooled in obedience and in the preconceptions of a rigid dogma
and is taught to revere the leadership. The party's leadership, 
in turn, is schooled in habits born of command, authority, 
manipulation and egomania. This situation is worsened when the
party participates in parliamentary elections. In election 
campaigns, the vanguard party models itself completely on 
existing bourgeois forms and even acquires the paraphernalia 
of the electoral party. . . 
</p><p>
"As the party expands, the distance between the leadership and
the ranks inevitably increases. Its leaders not only become
'personages,' they lose contact with the living situation below. 
The local groups, which know their own immediate situation better 
than any remote leaders, are obliged to subordinate their insights 
to directives from above. The leadership, lacking any direct 
knowledge of local problems, responds sluggishly and prudently. 
Although it stakes out a claim to the 'larger view,' to greater
'theoretical competence,' the competence of the leadership tends
to diminish as one ascends the hierarchy of command. The more
one approaches the level where the real decisions are made, the
more conservative is the nature of the decision-making process,
the more bureaucratic and extraneous are the factors which come
into play, the more considerations of prestige and retrenchment
supplant creativity, imagination, and a disinterested dedication
to revolutionary goals.
</p><p>
"The party becomes less efficient from a revolutionary point of 
view the more it seeks efficiency by means of hierarchy, cadres 
and centralisation. Although everyone marches in step, the orders 
are usually wrong, especially when events begin to move rapidly 
and take unexpected turns - as they do in all revolutions. . . 
</p><p>
"On the other hand, this kind of party is extremely vulnerable
in periods of repression. The bourgeoisie has only to grab its
leadership to destroy virtually the entire movement. With its
leaders in prison or in hiding, the party becomes paralysed; 
the obedient membership has no one to obey and tends to flounder.
Demoralisation sets in rapidly. The party decomposes not only
because of the repressive atmosphere but also because of its
poverty of inner resources.
</p><p>
"The foregoing account is not a series of hypothetical inferences,
it is a composite sketch of all the mass Marxian parties of the
past century - the Social Democrats, the Communists and the 
Trotskyist party of Ceylon (the only mass party of its kind). To 
claim that these parties failed to take their Marxian principles
seriously merely conceals another question: why did this failure
happen in the first place? The fact is, these parties were
co-opted into bourgeois society because they were structured 
along bourgeois lines. The germ of treachery existed in them
from birth."</i> [<b>Post-Scarcity Anarchism</b>, pp. 123-6]
</blockquote></p><p>
The evidence Bookchin summarises suggests that vanguard
parties are less than efficient in promoting revolutionary change.
Sluggish, unresponsive, undemocratic, they simply cannot 
adjust to the dynamic nature of social struggle, never mind
revolution. This is to be expected:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"For the state centralisation is the appropriate form of 
organisation, since it aims at the greatest possible uniformity 
in social life for the maintenance of political and social 
equilibrium. But for a movement whose very existence depends 
on prompt action at any favourable moment and on the independent 
thought and action of its supporters, centralism could but be a
curse by weakening its power of decision and systematically 
repressing all immediate action. If, for example, as was the 
case in Germany, every local strike had first to be approved 
by the Central, which was often hundreds of miles away and was 
not usually in a position to pass a correct judgement on the 
local conditions, one cannot wonder that the inertia of the 
apparatus of organisation renders a quick attack quite impossible, 
and there thus arises a state of affairs where the energetic and 
intellectually alert groups no longer serve as patterns for the 
less active, but are condemned by these to inactivity, inevitably 
bringing the whole movement to stagnation. Organisation is, after 
all, only a means to an end. When it becomes an end in itself, it 
kills the spirit and the vital initiative of its members and
sets up that domination by mediocrity which is the characteristic 
of all bureaucracies."</i> [Rudolf Rocker, <b>Anarcho-Syndicalism</b>, 
p. 61]
</blockquote></p><p>
As we discuss in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech512">section H.5.12</a>, the example of the Bolshevik
party during the Russian Revolution amply proves Rocker's point.
Rather than being a highly centralised, disciplined vanguard
party, the Bolshevik party was marked by extensive autonomy
throughout its ranks. Party discipline was regularly ignored,
including by Lenin in his attempts to get the central party 
bureaucracy to catch up with the spontaneous revolutionary 
actions and ideas of the Russian working class. As Bookchin 
summarised, the <i>"Bolshevik leadership was ordinarily extremely 
conservative, a trait that Lenin had to fight throughout 1917 
- first in his efforts to reorient the Central Committee 
against the provisional government (the famous conflict 
over the 'April Theses'), later in driving the Central 
Committee toward insurrection in October. In both cases he 
threatened to resign from the Central Committee and bring 
his views to 'the lower ranks of the party.'"</i> Once in power,
however, <i>"the Bolsheviks tended to centralise their party to 
the degree that they became isolated from the working class."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 126 and p. 127]
</p><p>
The "vanguard" model of organising is not only inefficient 
and ineffective from a revolutionary perspective, it 
generates bureaucratic and elitist tendencies which undermine
any revolution unfortunate enough to be dominated by such a
party. For these extremely practical and sensible reasons 
anarchists reject it wholeheartedly. As we discuss in the 
<a href="secH5.html#sech59">next section</a>, 
the only thing vanguard parties 
<b>are</b> effective at is to supplant the diversity produced and 
required by revolutionary movements with the drab conformity 
produced by centralisation and to replace popular power and
freedom with party power and tyranny.</p>

<a name="sech59"><h2>H.5.9 What are vanguard parties effective at?</h2></a>

<p>
As we discussed the <a href="secH5.html#sech58">last section</a>, 
vanguard parties are not 
efficient as agents of revolutionary change. So, it may be 
asked, what <b>are</b> vanguard parties effective at? If they 
are harmful to revolutionary struggle, what are they good 
at? The answer to this is simple. No anarchist would deny 
that vanguard parties are extremely efficient and effective 
at certain things, most notably reproducing hierarchy and 
bourgeois values into so-called <i>"revolutionary"</i> organisations 
and movements. As Murray Bookchin put it, the party <i>"is 
efficient in only one respect - in moulding society in its 
own hierarchical image if the revolution is successful. It 
recreates bureaucracy, centralisation and the state. It 
fosters the very social conditions which justify this 
kind of society. Hence, instead of 'withering away,' the 
state controlled by the 'glorious party' preserves the very 
conditions which 'necessitate' the existence of a state - 
and a party to 'guard' it."</i> [<b>Post-Scarcity Anarchism</b>, 
pp. 125-6]
</p><p>
By being structured along hierarchical lines that reflect
the very system that it professes to oppose, the vanguard 
party very "effectively" reproduces that system within both
the current radical social movements <b>and</b> any revolutionary
society that may be created. This means that once in power, 
it shapes society in its own image. Ironically, this tendency 
towards conservatism and bureaucracy was noted by Trotsky: 
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"As often happens, a sharp cleavage developed between the
classes in motion and the interests of the party machines.
Even the Bolshevik Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit 
of exceptional revolutionary training, were definitely 
inclined to disregard the masses and to identify their own
special interests and the interests of the machine on the
very day after the monarchy was overthrown. What, then, 
could be expected of these cadres when they became an 
all-powerful state bureaucracy?"</i> [<b>Stalin</b>, vol. 1, p. 298]
</blockquote></p><p>
In such circumstances, it is unsurprising that urging party
power and identifying it with working class power would have
less than revolutionary results. Discussing the Bolsheviks
in 1905 Trotsky points out this tendency existed from the
start:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The habits peculiar to a political machine were already
forming in the underground. The young revolutionary 
bureaucrat was already emerging as a type. The conditions
of conspiracy, true enough, offered rather merge scope
for such formalities of democracy as electiveness, 
accountability and control. Yet, undoubtedly the
committeemen narrowed these limitations considerably
more than necessity demanded and were far more intransigent
and severe with the revolutionary workingmen than with
themselves, preferring to domineer even on occasions
that called for lending an attentive ear to the voice
of the masses."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 101]
</blockquote></p><p>
He quoted Krupskaya, a party member, on these party bureaucrats,
the <i>"committeemen."</i> Krupskaya stated that <i>"as a rule"</i> 
they <i>"did not recognise any party democracy"</i> and <i>"did 
not want any innovations. The 'committeeman' did not desire, 
and did not know how to, adapt himself to rapidly changing 
conditions."</i> [quoted by Trotsky, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 101] 
This conservatism played havoc in the party during 1917, 
incidentally. It would be no exaggeration to argue that 
the Russian revolution occurred in spite of, rather than 
because of, Bolshevik organisational principles (see 
<a href="secH5.html#sech512">section H.5.12</a>). 
These principles, however, came into their own
once the party had seized power, ensuring the consolidation
of bureaucratic rule by an elite.
</p><p>
That a vanguard party helps to produces a bureaucratic regime 
once in power should not come as a surprise. If the party,
to use Trotsky's expression, exhibits a <i>"caste tendency of 
the committeemen"</i> can we be surprised if once in power it 
reproduces such a tendency in the state it is now the master
of? [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 102] And this <i>"tendency"</i> can be seen today
in the multitude of Leninist sects that exist.</p>

<a name="sech510"><h2>H.5.10 Why does <i>"democratic centralism"</i> produce <i>"bureaucratic centralism"</i>?</h2></a>

<p>
In spite of the almost ritualistic assertions that vanguard
parties are <i>"the most democratic the world has seen,"</i> an 
army of ex-members, expelled dissidents and disgruntled 
members testify that they do not live up to the hype. They
argue that most, if not all, "vanguard" parties are not
<i>"democratic centralist"</i> but are, in fact, <i>"bureaucratic
centralist."</i> Within the party, in other words, a bureaucratic
clique controls it from the top-down with little democratic
control, never mind participation. For anarchists, this is hardly 
surprising. The reasons why this continually happens are rooted in 
the nature of <i>"democratic centralism"</i> itself.
</p><p>
Firstly, the assumption of <i>"democratic centralism"</i> is that 
the membership elect a leadership and give them the power to 
decide policy between conferences and congresses. This has
a subtle impact on the membership, as it is assumed that the 
leadership has a special insight into social problems above 
and beyond that of anyone else, otherwise they would not
have been elected to such an important position. Thus many
in the membership come to believe that disagreements with 
the leadership's analysis, even before they had been clearly 
articulated, are liable to be wrong. Doubt dares not speak 
its name. Unquestioning belief in the party leadership has 
been an all to common recurring theme in many accounts of 
vanguard parties. The hierarchical structure of the party
promotes a hierarchical mentality in its members.
</p><p>
Conformity within such parties is also reinforced by the 
intense activism expected by members, particularly leading
activists and full-time members. Paradoxically, the more 
deeply people participate in activism, the harder it becomes 
to reflect on what they are doing. The unrelenting pace 
often induces exhaustion and depression, while making it 
harder to <i>"think your way out"</i> - too many commitments have 
been made and too little time is left over from party activity 
for reflection. Moreover, high levels of activism prevent 
many, particularly the most committed, from having a personal 
life outside their role as party members. This high-speed 
political existence means that rival social networks 
atrophy through neglect, so ensuring that the party line
is the only perspective which members get exposed to. Members 
tend to leave, typically, because of exhaustion, crisis, even 
despair rather than as the result of rational reflection 
and conscious decision.
</p><p>
Secondly, given that vanguard parties are based on the belief 
that they are the guardians of <i>"scientific socialism,"</i> this 
means that there is a tendency to squeeze all of social life 
into the confines of the party's ideology. Moreover, as the 
party's ideology is a "science" it is expected to explain 
everything (hence the tendency of Leninists to expound on 
every subject imaginable, regardless of whether the author 
knows enough about the subject to discuss it in an informed 
way). The view that the party's ideology explains everything 
eliminates the need for fresh or independent thought, precludes 
the possibility of critically appraising past practice or 
acknowledging mistakes, and removes the need to seek meaningful 
intellectual input outside the party's own ideological fortress. 
As Victor Serge, anarchist turned Bolshevik, admitted in his
memoirs: <i>"Bolshevik thinking is grounded in the possession of 
the truth. The Party is the repository of truth, and any
form of thinking which differs from it is a dangerous or
reactionary error. Here lies the spiritual source of its 
intolerance. The absolute conviction of its lofty mission
assures it of a moral energy quite astonishing in its
intensity - and, at the same time, a clerical mentality 
which is quick to become Inquisitorial."</i> [<b>Memoirs of 
a Revolutionary</b>, p. 134]
</p><p>
The intense level of activism means that members are bombarded 
with party propaganda, are in endless party meetings, or 
spend time reading party literature and so, by virtue of the 
fact that there is not enough time to read anything, members 
end up reading nothing but party publications. Most points of 
contact with the external world are eliminated or drastically 
curtailed. Indeed, such alternative sources of information 
and such thinking is regularly dismissed as being contaminated 
by bourgeois influences. This often goes so far as to label
those who question any aspect of the party's analysis 
revisionists or deviationists, bending to the <i>"pressures 
of capitalism,"</i> and are usually driven from the ranks as 
heretics. All this is almost always combined with contempt 
for all other organisations on the Left (indeed, the closer 
they are to the party's own ideological position the more 
likely they are to be the targets of abuse).
</p><p>
Thirdly, the practice of <i>"democratic centralism"</i> also aids this 
process towards conformity. Based on the idea that the party must 
be a highly disciplined fighting force, the party is endowed with 
a powerful central committee and a rule that all members must
publicly defend the agreed-upon positions of the party and the
decisions of the central committee, whatever opinions they might 
hold to the contrary in private. Between conferences, the party's 
leading bodies usually have extensive authority to govern the 
party's affairs, including updating party doctrine and deciding
the party's response to current political events.
</p><p>
As unity is the key, there is a tendency to view any opposition 
as a potential threat. It is not at all clear when <i>"full freedom 
to criticise"</i> policy internally can be said to disturb the unity 
of a defined action. The norms of democratic centralism confer 
all power between conferences onto a central committee, allowing 
it to become the arbiter of when a dissident viewpoint is in 
danger of weakening unity. The evidence from numerous vanguard
parties suggest that their leaderships usually view <b>any</b> 
dissent as precisely such a disruption and demand that dissidents 
cease their action or face expulsion from the party. 
</p><p>
It should also be borne in mind that Leninist parties also view 
themselves as vitally important to the success of any future 
revolution. This cannot help but reinforce the tendency to view 
dissent as something which automatically imperils the future of 
the planet and, therefore, something which must be combated at all 
costs. As Lenin stressed an a polemic directed to the international 
communist movement in 1920, <i>"[w]hoever brings about even the 
slightest weakening of the iron discipline of the party of the 
proletariat (especially during its dictatorship) is actually 
aiding the bourgeoisie against the proletariat."</i> [<b>Collected 
Works</b>, vol. 31, p. 45] As can be seen, Lenin stresses the 
importance of <i>"iron discipline"</i> at all times, not only during
the revolution when <i>"the party"</i> is applying <i>"its dictatorship"</i>
(see <a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a> 
for more on this aspect of Leninism). This 
provides a justification of whatever measures are required to 
restore the illusion of unanimity, including the trampling 
underfoot of whatever rights the membership may have on paper
and the imposition of any decisions the leadership considers
as essential between conferences.
</p><p>
Fourthly, and more subtly, it is well known that when people take 
a public position in defence of a proposition, there is a 
strong tendency for their private attitudes to shift so that 
they harmonise with their public behaviour. It is difficult to 
say one thing in public and hold to a set of private beliefs at 
variance with what is publicly expressed. In short, if people 
tell others that they support X (for whatever reason), they will
slowly begin to change their own opinions and, indeed, internally
come to support X. The more public such declarations have been, 
the more likely it is that such a shift will take place. This has 
been confirmed by empirical research (see R. Cialdini's <b>Influence: 
Science and Practice</b>). This suggests that if, in the name of 
democratic centralism, party members publicly uphold the party line, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to hold a private belief at 
variance with publicly expressed opinions. The evidence suggests 
that it is not possible to have a group of people presenting a 
conformist image to society at large while maintaining an 
inner party regime characterised by frank and full discussion. 
Conformity in public tends to produce conformity in private. So
given what is now known of social influence, <i>"democratic 
centralism"</i> is almost certainly destined to prevent genuine 
internal discussion. This is sadly all too often confirmed 
in the internal regimes of vanguard parties, where debate is
often narrowly focused on a few minor issues of emphasis 
rather than fundamental issues of policy and theory. 
</p><p>
It has already been noted (in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech55">section H.5.5</a>) that the 
organisational norms of democratic centralism imply a 
concentration of power at the top. There is abundant 
evidence that such a concentration has been a vital feature 
of every vanguard party and that such a concentration limits 
party democracy. An authoritarian inner party regime is 
maintained, which ensures that decision making is 
concentrated in elite hands. This regime gradually dismantles 
or ignores all formal controls on its activities. Members are 
excluded from participation in determining policy, calling 
leaders to account, or expressing dissent. This is usually 
combined with persistent assurances about the essentially 
democratic nature of the organisation, and the existence of 
exemplary democratic controls - on paper. Correlated with this
inner authoritarianism is a growing tendency toward the abuse 
of power by the leaders, who act in arbitrary ways, accrue 
personal power and so on (as noted by Trotsky with regards 
to the Bolshevik party machine). Indeed, it is often the case 
that activities that would provoke outrage if engaged in by 
rank-and-file members are tolerated when their leaders do it. 
As one group of Scottish libertarians noted: 
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"Further, in so far as our Bolshevik friends reject and defy 
capitalist and orthodox labourist conceptions, they also 
are as much 'individualistic' as the anarchist. Is it not 
boasted, for example, that on many occasions Marx, Lenin 
and Trotsky were prepared to be in a minority of one - if 
they thought they were more correct than all others on the 
question at issue? In this, like Galileo, they were quite 
in order. Where they and their followers, obsessed by the 
importance of their own judgement go wrong, is in their 
tendency to refuse this inalienable right to other 
protagonists and fighters for the working class."</i> [APCF, 
<i>"Our Reply,"</i> <b>Class War on the Home Front</b>, p. 70]
</blockquote></p><p>
As in any hierarchical structure, the tendency is for those in 
power to encourage and promote those who agree with them. 
This means that members usually find their influence and position
in the party dependent on their willingness to conform to the
hierarchy and its leadership. Dissenters will rarely find their
contribution valued and advancement is limited, which produces
a strong tendency not to make waves. As Miasnikov, a working 
class Bolshevik dissident, argued in 1921, <i>"the regime within 
the party"</i> meant that <i>"if someone dares to have the courage of 
his convictions,"</i> they are called either a self-seeker or, worse, 
a counter-revolutionary, a Menshevik or an SR. Moreover, within 
the party, favouritism and corruption were rife. In Miasnikov's 
eyes a new type of Communist was emerging, the toadying careerist 
who <i>"knows how to please his superiors."</i> [quoted by Paul
Avrich, <b>Bolshevik Opposition to Lenin</b>, p. 8 and p. 7] At 
the last party congress Lenin attended, Miasnikov was expelled. 
Only one delegate, V. V. Kosior, <i>"argued that Lenin had taken 
the wrong approach to the question of dissent. If someone . . . had 
the courage to point out deficiencies in party work, he was marked 
down as an oppositionist, relieved of authority, placed under 
surveillance, and - a reference to Miasnikov - even expelled 
from the party."</i> [Paul Avrich, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 15] Serge 
noted about the same period that Lenin <i>"proclaimed a purge of 
the Party, aimed at those revolutionaries who had come in from other 
parties - i.e. those who were not saturated with the Bolshevik 
mentality. This meant the establishment within the Party of a 
dictatorship of the old Bolsheviks, and the direction of 
disciplinary measures, not against the unprincipled careerists 
and conformist late-comers, but against those sections with a 
critical outlook."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 135]
</p><p>
This, of course, also applies to the party congress, on paper 
the sovereign body of the organisation. All too often 
resolutions at party conferences will either come from the 
leadership or be completely supportive of its position. If 
branches or members submit resolutions which are critical of
the leadership, enormous pressure is exerted to ensure that 
they are withdrawn. Moreover, often delegates to the congress
are not mandated by their branches, so ensuring that rank and
file opinions are not raised, never mind discussed. Other,
more drastic measures have been known to occur. Victor Serge
saw what he termed the <i>"Party steamroller"</i> at work in early
1921 when <i>"the voting [was] rigged for Lenin's and Zinoviev's
'majority'"</i> in one of the districts of Petrograd. [<b>Op. Cit.</b>,
p.123]
</p><p>
All to often, such parties have "elected" bodies which have,
in practice, usurped the normal democratic rights of members 
and become increasingly removed from formal controls. All 
practical accountability of the leaders to the membership 
for their actions is eliminated. Usually this authoritarian
structure is combined with militaristic sounding rhetoric and
the argument that the "revolutionary" movement needs to be 
organised in a more centralised way than the current class
system, with references to the state's forces of repression
(notably the army). As Murray Bookchin argued, the Leninist 
<i>"has always had a grudging admiration and respect for that 
most inhuman of all hierarchical institutions, the military."</i> 
[<b>Toward an Ecological Society</b>, p. 254f] 
</p><p>
The modern day effectiveness of the vanguard party can be 
seen by the strange fact that many Leninists fail to join 
any of the existing parties due to their bureaucratic 
internal organisation and that many members are expelled 
(or leave in disgust) as a result of their failed attempts to 
make them more democratic. If vanguard parties are such positive 
organisations to be a member of, why do they have such big 
problems with member retention? Why are there so many vocal 
ex-members? Why are so many Leninists ex-members of vanguard
parties, desperately trying to find an actual party which 
matches their own vision of democratic centralism rather 
than the bureaucratic centralism which seems the norm?
</p><p>
Our account of the workings of vanguard parties explains, in
part, why many anarchists and other libertarians voice concern 
about them and their underlying ideology. We do so because 
their practices are disruptive and alienate new activists, 
hindering the very goal (socialism/revolution) they claim 
to be aiming for. As anyone familiar with the numerous groupings
and parties in the Leninist left will attest, the anarchist
critique of vanguardism seems to be confirmed in reality while
the Leninist defence seems sadly lacking (unless, of course,
the person is a member of such a party and then their 
organisation is the exception to the rule!).</p>

<a name="sech511"><h2>H.5.11 Can you provide an example of the negative nature of vanguard parties?</h2></a>

<p>
Yes. Our theoretical critique of vanguardism we have presented
in the last few sections is more than proved by the empirical 
evidence of such parties in operation today. Rarely do 
"vanguard"</i> parties reach in practice the high hopes their 
supporters like to claim for them. Such parties are usually 
small, prone to splitting as well as leadership cults, and 
usually play a negative role in social struggle. A long line 
of ex-members complain that such parties are elitist,
hierarchical and bureaucratic. 
</p><p>
Obviously we cannot hope to discuss all such parties. As such,
we will take just one example, namely the arguments of one 
group of dissidents of the biggest British Leninist party, 
the <b>Socialist Workers Party</b>. It is worth quoting their 
account of the internal workings of the SWP at length:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The SWP is not democratic centralist but bureaucratic 
centralist. The leadership's control of the party is 
unchecked by the members. New perspectives are initiated 
exclusively by the central committee (CC), who then 
implement their perspective against all party opposition, 
implicit or explicit, legitimate or otherwise.
</p><p>
"Once a new perspective is declared, a new cadre is selected 
from the top down. The CC select the organisers, who select the
district and branch committees - any elections that take place
are carried out on the basis of 'slates' so that it is virtually
impossible for members to vote against the slate proposed by the
leadership. Any members who have doubts or disagreements are
written off as 'burnt out' and, depending on their reaction to
this, may be marginalised within the party and even expelled.
</p><p>
"These methods have been disastrous for the SWP in a number of 
ways: Each new perspective requires a new cadre (below the 
level of the CC), so the existing cadre are actively 
marginalised in the party. In this way, the SWP has failed 
to build a stable and experienced cadre capable of acting 
independently of the leadership. Successive layers of cadres 
have been driven into passivity, and even out of the 
revolutionary movement altogether. The result is the loss 
of hundreds of potential cadres. Instead of appraising the 
real, uneven development of individual cadres, the history 
of the party is written in terms of a star system (comrades 
currently favoured by the party) and a demonology (the 
'renegades' who are brushed aside with each turn of the 
party). As a result of this systematic dissolution of the 
cadre, the CC grows ever more remote from the membership 
and increasingly bureaucratic in its methods. In recent 
years the national committee has been abolished (it obediently 
voted for its own dissolution, on the recommendation of the 
CC), to be replaced by party councils made up of those 
comrades active at any one time (i.e. those who already 
agree with current perspectives); district committees are 
appointed rather than elected; the CC monopolise all 
information concerning the party, so that it is impossible 
for members to know much about what happens in the party 
outside their own branch; the CC give a distorted account 
of events rather than admit their mistakes . . . history 
is rewritten to reinforce the prestige of the CC . . . The 
outcome is a party whose conferences have no democratic 
function, but serve only to orientate party activists to carry 
out perspectives drawn up before the delegates even set out 
from their branches. At every level of the party, strategy and
tactics are presented from the top down, as pre-digested
instructions for action. At every level, the comrades 'below'
are seen only as a passive mass to be shifted into action,
rather than as a source of new initiatives . . . 
</p><p>
"The only exception is when a branch thinks up a new tactic 
to carry out the CC's perspective. In this case, the CC may 
take up this tactic and apply it across the party. In no way 
do rank and file members play an active role in determining 
the strategy and theory of the party - except in the negative 
sense that if they refuse to implement a perspective eventually 
even the CC notice, and will modify the line to suit. A political 
culture has been created in which the leadership outside of the 
CC consists almost solely of comrades loyal to the CC, willing 
to follow every turn of the perspective without criticism . . .
Increasingly, the bureaucratic methods used by the CC to enforce 
their control over the political direction of the party have 
been extended to other areas of party life. In debates over 
questions of philosophy, culture and even anthropology an 
informal party 'line' emerged (i.e. concerning matters in 
which there can be no question of the party taking a 'line'). 
Often behind these positions lay nothing more substantial 
than the opinions of this or that CC member, but adherence 
to the line quickly became a badge of party loyalty, 
disagreement became a stigma, and the effect was to close 
down the democracy of the party yet further by placing 
even questions of theory beyond debate. Many militants, 
especially working class militants with some experience 
of trade union democracy, etc., are often repelled by the 
undemocratic norms in the party and refuse to join, or 
keep their distance despite accepting our formal politics."</i>
[ISG, <b>Discussion Document of Ex-SWP Comrades</b>]
</blockquote></p><p>
The dissidents argue that a <i>"democratic"</i> party would involve 
the <i>"[r]egular election of all party full-timers, branch and 
district leadership, conference delegates, etc. with the right of 
recall,"</i> which means that in the SWP appointment of full-timers, 
leaders and so on is the norm. They argue for the <i>"right of 
branches to propose motions to the party conference"</i> and for 
the <i>"right for members to communicate horizontally in the party, 
to produce and distribute their own documents."</i> They stress 
the need for <i>"an independent Control Commission to review all 
disciplinary cases (independent of the leadership bodies that 
exercise discipline), and the right of any disciplined comrades 
to appeal directly to party conference."</i> They argue that in 
a democratic party <i>"no section of the party would have a 
monopoly of information"</i> which indicates that the SWP's 
leadership is essentially secretive, withholding information from 
the party membership. Even more significantly, given our discussion 
on the influence of the party structure on post-revolutionary society in 
<a href="secH5.html#sech57">section H.5.7</a>, 
they argue that <i>"[w]orst of all, the SWP are training a 
layer of revolutionaries to believe that the organisational norms 
of the SWP are a shining example of proletarian democracy, applicable 
to a future socialist society. Not surprisingly, many people are 
instinctively repelled by this idea."</i>
</p><p>
Some of these critics of specific Leninist parties do not give up 
hope and still look for a truly democratic centralist party rather 
than the bureaucratic centralist ones which seem so common. For 
example, our group of ex-SWP dissidents argue that <i>"[a]nybody 
who has spent time involved in 'Leninist' organisations will have 
come across workers who agree with Marxist politics but refuse to 
join the party because they believe it to be undemocratic and 
authoritarian. Many draw the conclusion that Leninism itself is 
at fault, as every organisation that proclaims itself Leninist 
appears to follow the same pattern."</i> [ISG, <b>Lenin vs. the 
SWP: Bureaucratic Centralism Or Democratic Centralism?</b>] This 
is a common refrain with Leninists - when reality says 
one thing and the theory another, it must be reality that 
is at fault. Yes, every Leninist organisation may be 
bureaucratic and authoritarian but it is not the theory's 
fault that those who apply it are not capable of actually 
doing so successfully. Such an application of scientific 
principles by the followers of <i>"scientific socialism"</i> is 
worthy of note - obviously the usual scientific method 
of generalising from facts to produce a theory is 
inapplicable when evaluating <i>"scientific socialism"</i> itself.
However, rather than ponder the possibility that <i>"democratic 
centralism"</i> does not actually work and automatically generates
the <i>"bureaucratic centralism,"</i> they point to the example of the
Russian revolution and the original Bolshevik party as proof
of the validity of their hopes.
</p><p>
Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to argue that the only reason 
people take the vanguard party organisational structure seriously
is the apparent success of the Bolsheviks in the Russian revolution.
However, as noted above, even the Bolshevik party was subject
to bureaucratic tendencies and as we discuss in the 
<a href="secH5.html#secH512">next section</a>, 
the experience of the 1917 Russian Revolutions disprove the 
effectiveness of <i>"vanguard"</i> style parties. The Bolshevik party 
of 1917 was a totally different form of organisation than the 
ideal <i>"democratic centralist"</i> type argued for by Lenin in 1902 
and 1920. As a model of revolutionary organisation, the 
"vanguardist"</i> one has been proven false rather than confirmed 
by the experience of the Russian revolution. Insofar as the 
Bolshevik party was effective, it operated in a non-vanguardist 
way and insofar as it did operate in such a manner, it held back 
the struggle.</p>

<a name="sech512"><h2>H.5.12 Surely the Russian Revolution proves 
that vanguard parties work?</h2></a>

<p>
No, far from it. Looking at the history of vanguardism we 
are struck by its failures, not its successes. Indeed, the 
proponents of <i>"democratic centralism"</i> can point to only one 
apparent success of their model, namely the Russian Revolution.
Strangely, though, we are warned by Leninists that failure to use 
the vanguard party will inevitably condemn future revolutions to 
failure: 
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The proletariat can take power only through its vanguard. . .  
Without the confidence of the class in the vanguard, without 
support of the vanguard by the class, there can be no talk 
of the conquest of power . . . The Soviets are the only 
organised form of the tie between the vanguard and the 
class. A revolutionary content can be given to this form 
only by the party. This is proved by the positive 
experience of the October Revolution and by the negative 
experience of other countries (Germany, Austria, finally, 
Spain). No one has either shown in practice or tried to 
explain articulately on paper how the proletariat can 
seize power without the political leadership of a party 
that knows what it wants."</i> [Trotsky, <b>Writings 
1936-37</b>, p. 490]
</blockquote></p><p>
To anarchist ears, such claims seem out of place. After all, 
did the Russian Revolution actually result in socialism or 
even a viable form of soviet democracy? Far from it. Unless 
you picture revolution as simply the changing of the party 
in power, you have to acknowledge that while the Bolshevik 
party <b>did</b> take power in Russian in November 1917, the net 
effect of this was <b>not</b> the stated goals that justified 
that action. Thus, if we take the term "effective" to mean 
"an efficient means to achieve the desired goals" then 
vanguardism has not been proven to be effective, quite 
the reverse (assuming that your desired goal is a socialist 
society, rather than party power). Needless to say, Trotsky 
blames the failure of the Russian Revolution on <i>"objective"</i> 
factors rather than Bolshevik policies and practice, an 
argument we address in <a href="secH6.html">section H.6</a> and will not 
do so here.
</p><p>
So while Leninists make great claims for the effectiveness of 
their chosen kind of party, the hard facts of history are 
against their positive evaluation of vanguard parties. 
Ironically, even the Russian Revolution disproves the claims
of Leninists. The fact is that the Bolshevik party in 1917 
was very far from the <i>"democratic centralist"</i> organisation 
which supporters of vanguardism like to claim it is. As 
such, its success in 1917 lies more in its divergence from 
the principles of <i>"democratic centralism"</i> than in their 
application. The subsequent degeneration of the revolution 
and the party is marked by the increasing <b>application</b> 
of those principles in the life of the party.
</p><p>
Thus, to refute the claims of the <i>"effectiveness"</i> and 
<i>"efficiency"</i> of vanguardism, we need to look at its one 
and only success, namely the Russian Revolution. As the Cohen-Bendit 
brothers argued, <i>"far from leading the Russian Revolution forwards, 
the Bolsheviks were responsible for holding back the struggle of the 
masses between February and October 1917, and later for turning the 
revolution into a bureaucratic counter-revolution - in both cases 
because of the party's very nature, structure and ideology."</i> Indeed,
<i>"[f]rom April to October, Lenin had to fight a constant battle
to keep the Party leadership in tune with the masses."</i> [<b>Obsolete 
Communism</b>, p. 183 and p. 187] It was only by continually violating 
its own <i>"nature, structure and ideology"</i> that the Bolshevik 
party 
played an important role in the revolution. Whenever the principles 
of <i>"democratic centralism"</i> were applied, the Bolshevik party 
played
the role the Cohen-Bendit brothers subscribed to it (and once in 
power, the party's negative features came to the fore).
</p><p>
Even Leninists acknowledge that, to quote Tony Cliff, throughout 
the history of Bolshevism, <i>"a certain conservatism arose."</i> 
Indeed,
<i>"[a]t practically all sharp turning points, Lenin had to rely on
the lower strata of the party machine against the higher, or on
the rank and file against the machine as a whole."</i> [<b>Lenin</b>, 
vol. 2, p. 135] This fact, incidentally, refutes the basic 
assumptions of Lenin's party schema, namely that the broad party
membership, like the working class, was subject to bourgeois 
influences so necessitating central leadership and control from
above.
</p><p>
Looking at both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, we are struck 
by how often this <i>"conservatism"</i> arose and how often the higher
bodies lagged behind the spontaneous actions of the masses and 
the party membership. Looking at the 1905 revolution, we discover
a classic example of the inefficiency of "democratic centralism."
Facing the rise of the soviets, councils of workers' 
delegates elected to co-ordinate strikes and other forms of 
struggle, the Bolsheviks did not know what to do. <i>"The 
Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks,"</i> noted Trotsky, <i>"was 
frightened at first by such an innovation as a non-partisan 
representation of the embattled masses, and could find nothing 
better to do than to present the Soviet with an ultimatum: 
immediately adopt a Social-Democratic program or disband. The 
Petersburg Soviet as a whole, including the contingent of 
Bolshevik workingmen as well ignored this ultimatum without 
batting an eyelash."</i> [<b>Stalin</b>, vol. 1, p. 106] More than 
that, <i>"[t]he party's Central Committee published the resolution 
on October 27, thereby making it the binding directive for all 
other Bolshevik organisations."</i> [Oskar Anweiler, <b>The 
Soviets</b>, 
p. 77] It was only the return of Lenin which stopped the 
Bolshevik's open attacks against the Soviet. As we discuss
in <a href="secH6.html#sech62">section H.6.2</a>, the rationale 
for these attacks is significant as they were based on arguing
that the soviets could not reflect workers' interests because 
they were elected by the workers! The implications of this 
perspective came clear in 1918, when the Bolsheviks gerrymandered 
and disbanded soviets to remain in power (see 
<a href="secH6.html#sech61">section H.6.1</a>). That the Bolshevik's 
position flowed naturally from Lenin's arguments in <b>What is to be
Done?</b> is clear. Thus the underlying logic of Lenin's 
vanguardism ensured that the Bolsheviks played a negative 
role with regards the soviets which, combined with "democratic 
centralism" ensured that it was spread far and wide. Only by 
ignoring their own party's principles and staying in the 
Soviet did rank and file Bolsheviks play a positive role in 
the revolution. This divergence of top and bottom would be 
repeated in 1917.
</p><p>
Given this, perhaps it is unsurprising that Leninists started
to rewrite the history of the 1905 revolution. Victor Serge, an
anti-Stalinist Leninist, asserted in the late 1920s that in 
1905 the Petrograd Soviet was <i>"led by Trotsky and inspired 
by the Bolsheviks."</i> [<b>Year One of the Russian Revolution</b>, 
p. 36]. While the former claim is partially correct, the latter 
is not. As noted, the Bolsheviks were initially opposed the 
soviets and systematically worked to undermine them. 
Unsurprisingly, Trotsky at that time was a Menshevik, not 
a Bolshevik. After all, how could the most revolutionary
party that ever existed have messed up so badly? How could
democratic centralism faired so badly in practice? Best,
then, to suggest that it did not and give the Bolsheviks
a role better suited to the rhetoric of Bolshevism than
its reality. 
</p><p>
Trotsky was no different. He, needless to say, denied the obvious implications 
of these events in 1905. While admitting that the Bolsheviks <i>"adjusted 
themselves more slowly to the sweep of the movement"</i> and that the Mensheviks 
<i>"were preponderant in the Soviet,"</i> he tries to save vanguardism 
by asserting that <i>"the general direction of the Soviet's
policy proceeded in the main along Bolshevik lines."</i> So, in
spite of the lack of Bolshevik influence, in spite of the 
slowness in adjusting to the revolution, Bolshevism was, in
fact, the leading set of ideas in the revolution! Ironically, 
a few pages later, he mocks the claims of Stalinists that Stalin
had <i>"isolated the Mensheviks from the masses"</i> by noting that
the <i>"figures hardly bear [the claims] out."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 
112 
and p. 117] Shame he did not apply this criteria to his own assertions. 
</p><p>
Of course, every party makes mistakes. The question is, 
how did the <i>"most revolutionary party of all time"</i> fare 
in 1917. Surely that revolution proves the validity of 
vanguardism and "democratic centralism"? After all, there 
was a successful revolution, the Bolshevik party did seize 
power. However, the apparent success of 1917 was not due 
to the application of "democratic centralism," quite the 
reverse. While the myth of 1917 is that a highly efficient, 
democratic centralist vanguard party ensured the overthrow 
of the Provisional Government in November 1917 in favour 
of the Soviets (or so it seemed at the time) the facts are 
somewhat different. Rather, the Bolshevik party throughout 
1917 was a fairly loose collection of local organisations 
(each more than willing to ignore central commands and 
express their autonomy), with much internal dissent and 
infighting and no discipline beyond what was created by 
common loyalty. The "democratic centralist" party, as 
desired by Lenin, was only created in the course of the 
Civil War and the tightening of the party dictatorship. 
In other words, the party became more like a "democratic 
centralist" one as the revolution degenerated. As such, 
the various followers of Lenin (Stalinists, Trotskyists 
and their multitude of offshoots) subscribe to a myth, 
which probably explains their lack of success in 
reproducing a similar organisation since. So assuming 
that the Bolsheviks did play an important role in the 
Russian revolution, it was because it was <b>not</b> the 
centralised, disciplined Bolshevik party of Leninist 
myth. Indeed, when the party <b>did</b> operate in a vanguardist
manner, failure was soon to follow.
</p><p>
This claim can be proven by looking at the history of the 1917 
revolution. The February revolution started with a spontaneous 
protests and strikes yet <i>"the Petrograd organisation of the 
Bolsheviks opposed the calling of strikes precisely on the eve 
of the revolution which was destined to overthrow the Tsar. 
Fortunately, the workers ignored the Bolshevik 'directives' 
and went on strike anyway. In the events which followed, no one 
was more surprised by the revolution than the 'revolutionary' 
parties, including the Bolsheviks."</i> [Murray Bookchin, 
<b>Post-Scarcity Anarchism</b>, p. 123] Trotsky quoted one
of the Bolshevik leaders at the time:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"Absolutely no guiding initiative from the party centres
was felt . . . the Petrograd Committee had been arrested 
and the representative of the Central Committee . . . was
unable to give any directives for the coming day."</i> [quoted
by Trotsky, <b>History of the Russian Revolution</b>, vol. 1, 
p. 147]
</blockquote></p><p>
Not the best of starts. Of course rank and file Bolsheviks
took part in the demonstrations, street fights and strikes
and so violated the principles their party was meant
to be based on. As the revolution progressed, so did the 
dual nature of the Bolshevik party (i.e. its practical 
divergence from "democratic centralism" in order to be 
effective and attempts to force it back into that schema
which handicapped the revolution). However, during 1917, 
"democratic centralism" was ignored in order to ensure 
the Bolsheviks played any role at all in the revolution.
As one historian of the party makes clear, in 1917 and
until the outbreak of the Civil War, the party operated
in ways that few modern "vanguard" parties would tolerate:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The committees were a law unto themselves when it came to 
accepting orders from above. Democratic centralism, as
vague a principle of internal administration as there ever
has been, was commonly held at least to enjoin lower 
executive bodies that they should obey the behests of all
higher bodies in the organisational hierarchy. But town
committees in practice had the devil's own job in imposing
firm leadership . . . Insubordination was the rule of the 
day whenever lower party bodies thought questions of 
importance were at stake.
</p><p>
"Suburb committees too faced difficulties in imposing 
discipline. Many a party cell saw fit to thumb its nose
at higher authority and to pursue policies which it 
felt to be more suited to local circumstances or more
desirable in general. No great secret was made of this.
In fact, it was openly admitted that hardly a party 
committee existed which did not encounter problems 
in enforcing its will even upon individual activists."</i> 
[Robert Service, <b>The Bolshevik Party in Revolution
1917-1923</b>, pp. 51-2]
</blockquote></p><p>
So while Lenin's ideal model of a disciplined, centralised
and top-down party had been expounded since 1902, the 
operation of the party never matched his desire. As Service
notes, <i>"a disciplined hierarchy of command stretching down 
from the regional committees to party cells"</i> had <i>"never 
existed in Bolshevik history."</i> In the heady days of the
revolution, when the party was flooded by new members, Bolshevik 
party life was the exact opposite of that usually considered
(by both opponents and supporters of Bolshevism) as it
normal mode of operation. <i>"Anarchist attitudes to higher 
authority,"</i> he argues, <i>"were the rule of the day"</i> and
<i>"no Bolshevik leader in his right mind could have
contemplated a regular insistence upon rigid standards of
hierarchical control and discipline unless he had abandoned
all hope of establishing a mass socialist party."</i> This 
meant that <i>"in the Russia of 1917 it was the easiest thing 
in the world for lower party bodies to rebut the demands and 
pleas by higher authority."</i> He stresses that <i>"[s]uburb and 
town committees . . . often refused to go along with official 
policies . . . they also . . . sometimes took it into their 
heads to engage in active obstruction."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 80, 
p. 62 p. 56 and p. 60]
</p><p>
This worked both ways, of course. Town committees did <i>"snub 
their nose at lower-echelon viewpoints in the time before the 
next election. Try as hard as they might, suburb committees 
and ordinary cells could meanwhile do little to rectify 
matters beyond telling their own representative on their
town committee to speak on their behalf. Or, if this too
failed, they could resort to disruptive tactics by 
criticising it in public and refusing it all collaboration."</i>
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 52-3] Even by early 1918, the Bolshevik 
party bore little resemblance to the "democratic centralist"
model desires by Lenin:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The image of a disciplined hierarchy of party committees was
therefore but a thin, artificial veneer which was used by 
Bolshevik leaders to cover up the cracked surface of the 
real picture underneath. Cells and suburb committees saw
no reason to kow-tow to town committees; nor did town 
committees feel under compulsion to show any greater respect 
to their provincial and regional committees than before."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 74]
</blockquote></p><p>
It is this insubordination, this local autonomy and action
in spite of central orders which explains the success of
the Bolsheviks in 1917. Rather than a highly centralised
and disciplined body of "professional" revolutionaries, 
the party saw a <i>"significant change . . . within
the membership of the party at local level . . . From the
time of the February revolution requirements for party
membership had been all but suspended, and now Bolshevik
ranks swelled with impetuous recruits who knew next to
nothing about Marxism and who were united by little more
than overwhelming impatience for revolutionary action."</i>
[Alexander Rabinowitch, <b>Prelude to Revolution</b>, p. 41]
</p><p>
This mass of new members (many of whom were peasants who 
had just recently joined the industrial workforce) had a
radicalising effect on the party's policies and structures.
As even Leninist commentators argue, it was this influx of
members who allowed Lenin to gain support for his radical 
revision of party aims in April. However, in spite of this 
radicalisation of the party base, the party machine still 
was at odds with the desires of the party. As Trotsky 
acknowledged, the situation <i>"called for resolute 
confrontation of the sluggish Party machine with 
masses and ideas in motion."</i> He stressed that <i>"the 
masses were incomparably more revolutionary than the 
Party, which in turn was more revolutionary than its 
committeemen."</i> Ironically, given the role Trotsky usually 
gave the party, he admits that <i>"[w]ithout Lenin, no one 
had known what to make of the unprecedented situation."</i> 
[<b>Stalin</b>, vol. 1, p. 301, p. 305 and p. 297]
</p><p>
Which is significant in itself. The Bolshevik party is
usually claimed as being the most "revolutionary" that 
ever existed, yet here is Trotsky admitting that its 
leading members did not have a clue what to do. He even
argued that <i>"[e]very time the Bolshevik leaders had to 
act without Lenin they fell into error, usually inclining 
to the Right."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 299] This negative opinion 
of the Bolsheviks applied even to the <i>"left Bolsheviks,
especially the workers"</i> whom we are informed <i>"tried with
all their force to break through this quarantine"</i> created
by the Bolshevik leaders policy <i>"of waiting, of accommodation,
and of actual retreat before the Compromisers"</i> after the
February revolution and before the arrival of Lenin. 
Trotsky argued that <i>"they did not know how to refute the
premise about the bourgeois character of the revolution
and the danger of an isolation of the proletariat. They
submitted, gritting their teeth, to the directions of
their leaders."</i> [<b>History of the Russian Revolution</b>,
vol. 1, p. 273] It seems strange, to say the least, that
without one person the whole of the party was reduced to
such a level given that the aim of the "revolutionary" 
party was to develop the political awareness of its 
members.
</p><p>
Lenin's arrival, according to Trotsky, allowed the influence 
of the more radical rank and file to defeat the conservatism
of the party machine. By the end of April, Lenin had managed 
to win over the majority of the party leadership to his 
position. However, this <i>"April conflict between Lenin and 
the general staff of the party was not the only one of its 
kind. Throughout the whole history of Bolshevism . . . all 
the leaders of the party at all the most important moments 
stood to the <b>right</b> of Lenin."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 305] As such, if "democratic centralism" had worked as 
intended, the whole party would have been arguing for 
incorrect positions the bulk of its existence (assuming, of 
course, that Lenin was correct most of the time). 
</p><p>
For Trotsky, <i>"Lenin exerted influence not so much as an 
individual but because he embodied the influence of the 
class on the Party and of the Party on its machine."</i> 
Yet, this was the machine which Lenin had forged, which 
embodied his vision of how a "revolutionary" party should 
operate and was headed by him. To argue that the party machine 
was behind the party membership and the membership behind the
class shows the bankruptcy of Lenin's organisational scheme.
This "backwardness", moreover, indicates an independence of
the party bureaucracy from the membership and the membership
from the masses. As Lenin's constantly repeated aim was for 
the party to seize power (based on the dubious assumption 
that class power would only be expressed, indeed was identical
to, party power) this independence held serious dangers, 
dangers which became apparent once this goal was achieved.
This is confirmed when Trotsky asked the question <i>"by what 
miracle did Lenin manage in a few short weeks to turn the Party's 
course into a new channel?"</i> Significantly, he answers as follows: 
<i>"Lenin's personal attributes and the objective situation."</i> 
[<b>Stalin</b>, vol. 1, p. 299] No mention is made of the 
democratic features of the party organisation, which suggests 
that without Lenin the rank and file party members would not 
have been able to shift the weight of the party machine in their 
favour. Trotsky seemed close to admitting this:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"As often happens, a sharp cleavage developed between the
classes in motion and the interests of the party machines.
Even the Bolshevik Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit 
of exceptional revolutionary training, were definitely 
inclined to disregard the masses and to identify their own
special interests and the interests of the machine on the
very day after the monarchy was overthrown."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
vol. 1, p. 298]
</blockquote></p><p>
Thus the party machine, which embodied the principles of
"democratic centralism" proved less than able to the task
assigned it in practice. Without Lenin, it is doubtful
that the party membership would have overcome the party 
machine:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"Lenin was strong not only because he understood the laws
of the class struggle but also because his ear was 
faultlessly attuned to the stirrings of the masses in
motion. He represented not so much the Party machine as
the vanguard of the proletariat. He was definitely 
convinced that thousands from among those workers who
had borne the brunt of supporting the underground Party
would now support him. The masses at the moment were
more revolutionary than the Party, and the Party more
revolutionary than its machine. As early as March the
actual attitude of the workers and soldiers had in many
cases become stormily apparent, and it was widely at
variance with the instructions issued by all the parties,
including the Bolsheviks."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 299]
</blockquote></p><p>
Little wonder the local party groupings ignored the 
party machine, practising autonomy and initiative in
the face of a party machine inclined to conservatism,
inertia, bureaucracy and remoteness. This conflict 
between the party machine and the principles it was 
based on and the needs of the revolution and party
membership was expressed continually throughout 1917:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"In short, the success of the revolution called for action
against the 'highest circles of the party,' who, from 
February to October, utterly failed to play the 
revolutionary role they ought to have taken in theory.
The masses themselves made the revolution, with or even
against the party - this much at least was clear to
Trotsky the historian. But far from drawing the correct
conclusion, Trotsky the theorist continued to argue 
that the masses are incapable of making a revolution 
without a leader."</i> [Daniel & Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, 
<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 188]
</blockquote></p><p>
Looking at the development of the revolution from April
onwards, we are struck by the sluggishness of the party
hierarchy. At every revolutionary upsurge, the party 
simply was not to the task of responding to the needs of
masses and the local party groupings closest to them.
The can be seen in June, July and October itself. At 
each turn, the rank and file groupings or Lenin had to
constantly violate the principles of their own party
in order to be effective. 
</p><p>
For example, when discussing the cancellation by the central 
committee of a demonstration planned for June 10th by 
the Petrograd Bolsheviks, the unresponsiveness of the 
party hierarchy can be seen. The <i>"speeches by Lenin and 
Zinoviev [justifying their actions] by no means satisfied
the Petersburg Committee. If anything, it appears that 
their explanations served to strengthen the feeling that
at best the party leadership had acted irresponsibly and
incompetently and was seriously out of touch with reality."</i> 
Indeed, many <i>"blamed the Central Committee for taking so 
long to respond to Military Organisation appeals for a 
demonstration."</i> During the discussions in late June, 
1917, on whether to take direct action against the Provisional 
Government there was a <i>"wide gulf"</i> between lower organs 
evaluations of the current situation and that of the Central 
Committee. [Rabinowitch, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 88, p. 92 and 
p. 129] Indeed, among the delegates from the Bolshevik military 
groups, only Lashevich (an old Bolshevik) spoke in favour of the 
Central Committee position and he noted that <i>"[f]requently it 
is impossible to make out where the Bolshevik ends and the Anarchist
begins."</i> [quoted by Rabinowitch, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 129]
</p><p>
In the July days, the breach between the local party groups
and the central committee increased. This spontaneous uprising 
was opposed to by the Bolshevik leadership, in spite of the
leading role of their own militants (along with anarchists)
in fermenting it. While calling on their own activists to
restrain the masses, the party leadership was ignored by 
the rank and file membership who played an active role in
the event. Sickened by being asked to play the role of
<i>"fireman"</i>, the party militants rejected party discipline in
order to maintain their credibility with the working class.
Rank and file activists, pointing to the snowballing of 
the movement, showed clear dissatisfaction with the Central 
Committee. One argued that it <i>"was not aware of the latest 
developments when it made its decision to oppose the movement 
into the streets."</i> Ultimately, the Central Committee appeal 
<i>"for restraining the masses . . . was removed from"</i>
<b>Pravda</b> <i>"and so the party's indecision was reflected 
by a large blank space on page one."</i> [Rabinowitch, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 150, p. 159 and p. 175] Ultimately, the indecisive nature
of the leadership can be explained by the fact it did not
think it could seize state power for itself (<i>"the state of 
popular consciousness . . . made impossible the seizure of power 
by the Bolsheviks in July."</i> [Trotsky, <b>History of the 
Russian Revolution</b>, vol. 2, p. 81]).
</p><p>
The indecision of the party hierarchy did have an effect,
of course. While the anarchists at Kronstadt looked at the
demonstration as the start of an uprising, the Bolsheviks
there were <i>"wavering indecisively in the middle"</i> between 
them and the Left-Social Revolutionaries who saw it as a 
means of applying pressure on the government. This was because
they were <i>"hamstrung by the indecision of the party Central
Committee."</i> [Rabinowitch, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 187] Little wonder
so many Bolshevik party organisations developed and protected
their own autonomy and ability to act! 
</p><p>
Significantly, one of the main Bolshevik groupings 
which helped organise and support the July uprising, 
the Military Organisation, started their own paper 
after the Central Committee had decreed after the 
failed revolt that neither it, nor the Petersburg 
Committee, should be allowed to have one. It <i>"angrily 
insisted on what it considered its just prerogatives"</i> 
and in <i>"no uncertain terms it affirmed its right to 
publish an independent newspaper and formally protested 
what is referred to as 'a system of persecution and repression
of an extremely peculiar character which had begun with 
the election of the new Central Committee.'"</i> [Rabinowitch,
<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 227] The Central Committee backed down, 
undoubtedly due to the fact it could not enforce its
decision.
</p><p>
This was but one example of what the Cohn-Bendit brothers pointed
to, namely that <i>"five months after the Revolution and three months 
before the October uprising, the masses were still governing themselves, 
and the Bolshevik vanguard simply had to toe the line."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 186] Within that vanguard, the central committee proved to be out of 
touch with the rank and file, who ignored it rather than break with their 
fellow workers. 
</p><p>
Even by October, the party machine still lagged behind the
needs of the revolution. In fact, Lenin could only impose
his view by going over the head of the Central Committee.
According to Trotsky's account, <i>"this time he [wa]s not
satisfied with furious criticism"</i> of the <i>"ruinous Fabianism
of the Petrograd leadership"</i> and <i>"by way of protest he
resign[ed] from the Central Committee."</i> [<b>History of the
Russian Revolution</b>, vol. 3, p. 131] Trotsky quoted
Lenin as follows:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"I am compelled to request permission to withdraw from
the Central Committee, which I hereby do, and leave 
myself freedom of agitation in the lower ranks of the
party and at the party congress."</i> [quoted by Trotsky,
<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 131]
</blockquote></p><p>
Thus the October revolution was precipitated by a blatant 
violation of the principles Lenin spent his life advocating.
Indeed, if someone else other than Lenin had done this we
are sure that Lenin, and his numerous followers, would have
dismissed it as the action of a <i>"petty-bourgeois intellectual"</i>
who cannot handle party <i>"discipline."</i> This is itself is
significant, as is the fact that he decided to appeal to
the <i>"lower ranks"</i> of the party - rather than
being "democratic" the party machine effectively blocked
communication and control from the bottom-up. Looking to
the more radical party membership, he <i>"could only impose
his view by going over the head of his Central Committee."</i> 
[Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 187] He
made sure to send his letter of protest to <i>"the Petrograd
and Moscow committees"</i> and also made sure that <i>"copies fell
into the hands of the more reliable party workers of the
district locals."</i> By early October (and <i>"over the heads of
the Central Committee"</i>) he wrote <i>"directly to the Petrograd
and Moscow committees"</i> calling for insurrection. He also
<i>"appealed to a Petrograd party conference to speak a firm
word in favour of insurrection."</i> [Trotsky, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 131 and p. 132]
</p><p>
In October, Lenin had to fight what he called <i>"a wavering"</i> 
in the <i>"upper circles of the party"</i> which lead to a <i>"sort
of dread of the struggle for power, an inclination to replace this 
struggle with resolutions protests, and conferences."</i> [quoted 
by Trotsky, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 132] For Trotsky, this represented 
<i>"almost a direct pitting of the party against the Central 
Committee,"</i> required because <i>"it was a question of the fate 
of the revolution"</i> and so <i>"all other considerations fell 
away."</i> On October 8th, when Lenin addressed the Bolshevik 
delegates of the forthcoming Northern Congress of Soviets on this 
subject, he did so <i>"personally"</i> as there <i>"was no party 
decision"</i> and the <i>"higher institutions of the party had not 
yet expressed themselves."</i> [Trotsky, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 132-3 
and p. 133] Ultimately, the Central Committee came round to Lenin's 
position but they did so under pressure of means at odds with the 
principles of the party.
</p><p>
This divergence between the imagine and reality of the Bolsheviks 
explains their success. If the party had applied or had remained 
true to the principles of "democratic centralism" it is doubtful 
that it would have played an important role in the movement. As
Alexander Rabinowitch argues, Bolshevik organisational unity and 
discipline is <i>"vastly exaggerated"</i> and, in fact, Bolshevik 
success in 1917 was down to <i>"the party's internally relatively 
democratic, tolerant, and decentralised structure and method of 
operation, as well as its essentially open and mass character - 
in striking contrast to the traditional Leninist model."</i>
In 1917, he goes on, <i>"subordinate party bodies like the 
Petersburg Committee and the Military Organisation were
permitted considerable independence and initiative . . .
Most importantly, these lower bodies were able to tailor 
their tactics and appeals to suit their own particular 
constituencies amid rapidly changing conditions. Vast 
numbers of new members were recruited into the party . . . The 
newcomers included tens of thousands of workers and soldiers . . . 
who knew little, if anything, about Marxism and cared nothing 
about party discipline."</i> For example, while the slogan 
<i>"All Power to the Soviets"</i> was <i>"officially withdrawn 
by the Sixth [Party] Congress in late July, this change did not 
take hold at the local level."</i> [<b>The Bolsheviks Come to 
Power</b>, p. 311, p. 312 and p. 313]
</p><p>
It is no exaggeration to argue that if any member of a current 
vanguard party acted as the Bolshevik rank and file did in 1917, 
they would quickly be expelled (this probably explains why no
such party has been remotely successful since). However, this 
ferment from below was quickly undermined within the party 
with the start of the Civil War. It is from this period when 
"democratic centralism" was actually applied within the party
and clarified as an organisational principle:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"It was quite a turnabout since the anarchic days before the
Civil War. The Central Committee had always advocated the
virtues of obedience and co-operation; but the rank-and-filers
of 1917 had cared little about such entreaties as they did
about appeals made by other higher authorities. The wartime
emergency now supplied an opportunity to expatiate on this
theme at will."</i> [Service, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 91]
</blockquote></p><p>
Service stresses that <i>"it appears quite remarkable how 
quickly the Bolsheviks, who for years had talked idly 
about a strict hierarchy of command inside the party, at 
last began to put ideas into practice."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 96]
</p><p>
In other words, the conversion of the Bolshevik party into a 
fully fledged <i>"democratic centralist"</i> party occurred 
during the degeneration of the Revolution. This was both a 
consequence of the rising authoritarianism within the party,
state  and society as well as one of its causes so it 
is quite ironic that the model used by modern day followers 
of Lenin is that of the party during the decline of the 
revolution, not its peak. This is not surprising. Once in 
power, the Bolshevik party imposed a state capitalist regime 
onto the Russian people. Can it be surprising that the party
structure which it developed to aid this process was also
based on bourgeois attitudes and organisation? The party model 
advocated by Lenin may not have been very effective during a 
revolution but it was exceedingly effective at promoting 
hierarchy and authority in the post-revolutionary regime. 
It simply replaced the old ruling elite with another, made 
up of members of the radical intelligentsia and the odd 
ex-worker or ex-peasant.
</p><p>
This was due to the hierarchical and top-down nature of 
the party Lenin had created. While the party base was 
largely working class, the leadership was not. Full-time 
revolutionaries, they were either middle-class intellectuals 
or (occasionally) ex-workers and (even rarer) ex-peasants 
who had left their class to become part of the party machine. 
Even the delegates at the party congresses did not truly 
reflect class basis of the party membership. For example, 
the number of delegates was still dominated by white-collar 
or others (59.1% to 40.9%) at the sixth party congress at 
the end of July 1917. [Cliff, <b>Lenin</b>, vol. 2, p. 160] So 
while the party gathered more working class members in 
1917, it cannot be said that this was reflected in the 
party leadership which remained dominated by non-working 
class elements. Rather than being a genuine working class 
organisation, the Bolshevik party was a hierarchical group 
headed by non-working class elements whose working class 
base could not effectively control them even during the 
revolution in 1917. It was only effective because these 
newly joined and radicalised working class members 
ignored their own party structure and its defining 
ideology.
</p><p>
After the revolution, the Bolsheviks saw their membership 
start to decrease. Significantly, <i>"the decline in numbers 
which occurred from early 1918 onwards"</i> started happening 
<i>"contrary to what is usually assumed, some months before 
the Central Committee's decree in midsummer that the party 
should be purged of its 'undesirable' elements."</i> These lost 
members reflected two things. Firstly, the general decline in 
the size of the industrial working class. This meant that the 
radicalised new elements from the countryside which had flocked 
to the Bolsheviks in 1917 returned home. Secondly, the lost of 
popular support due to the realities of the Bolshevik regime. 
This can be seen from the fact that while the Bolsheviks were 
losing members, the Left SRS almost doubled in size to 100,000 
(the Mensheviks claimed to have a similar number). Rather 
than non-proletarians leaving, <i>"[i]t is more probable by 
far that it was industrial workers who were leaving in 
droves. After all, it would have been strange if the 
growing unpopularity of Sovnarkom in factory milieu 
had been confined exclusively to non-Bolsheviks."</i> 
Unsurprisingly, given its position in power, <i>"[a]s the 
proportion of working-class members declined, so that
of entrants from the middle-class rose; the steady drift
towards a party in which industrial workers no longer
numerically predominated was under way."</i> By late 1918 
membership started to increase again but <i>"[m]ost newcomers 
were not of working-class origin . . . the proportion of 
Bolsheviks of working-class origin fell from 57 per cent 
at the year's beginning to 48 per cent at the end."</i> It 
should be noted that it was not specified how many were 
classed as having working-class origin were still employed 
in working-class jobs. [Robert Service, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 70, 
pp. 70-1 and p. 90] A new ruling elite was thus born,
thanks to the way vanguard parties are structured and the
application of vanguardist principles which had previously
been ignored.
</p><p>
In summary, the experience of the Russian Revolution does
not, in fact, show the validity of the "vanguard" model.
The Bolshevik party in 1917 played a leading role in the
revolution only insofar as its members violated its own
organisational principles (Lenin included). Faced with a
real revolution and an influx of more radical new members,
the party had to practice anarchist ideas of autonomy,
local initiative and the ignoring of central orders which
had no bearing to reality on the ground. When the party 
did try to apply the top-down and hierarchical principles
of "democratic centralism" it failed to adjust to the 
needs of the moment. Moreover, when these principles were
finally applied they helped ensure the degeneration of
the revolution. This was to be expected, given the nature
of vanguardism and the Bolshevik vision of socialism.</p>

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