/usr/share/lxc/config/gentoo.moresecure.conf is in lxc-templates 2.0.0-0ubuntu2.
This file is owned by root:root, with mode 0o644.
The actual contents of the file can be viewed below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 | # This derives from the global common config
lxc.include = /usr/share/lxc/config/common.conf
# Gentoo security oriented default configuration
# This is a more security oriented container configuration
# "More" because this is far from fully secure
# Looking for more working features and you trust your
# Container user ? see gentoo.common.conf
# do not mount sysfs, see http://blog.bofh.it/debian/id_413
lxc.mount.entry=mqueue dev/mqueue mqueue rw,nodev,noexec,nosuid,create=dir 0 0
lxc.mount.entry=shm dev/shm tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,create=dir 0 0
lxc.mount.entry=run run tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,mode=755 0 0
# Capabilities
# Uncomment these if you don't run anything that needs the capability, and
# would like the container to run with less privilege.
#
# Dropping sys_admin disables container root from doing a lot of things
# that could be bad like re-mounting lxc fstab entries rw for example,
# but also disables some useful things like being able to nfs mount, and
# things that are already namespaced with ns_capable() kernel checks, like
# hostname(1).
# lxc.cap.drop = sys_admin # breaks systemd
# lxc.cap.drop = net_raw # breaks dhcp/ping
# lxc.cap.drop = setgid # breaks login (initgroups/setgroups)
# lxc.cap.drop = dac_read_search # breaks login (pam unix_chkpwd)
# lxc.cap.drop = setuid # breaks sshd,nfs statd
# lxc.cap.drop = audit_control # breaks sshd (set_loginuid failed)
# lxc.cap.drop = audit_write
# lxc.cap.drop = setpcap # breaks journald
# lxc.cap.drop = sys_resources # breaks systemd
lxc.cap.drop = audit_control audit_write dac_read_search fsetid ipc_owner linux_immutable mknod setfcap setpcap sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice sys_pacct sys_ptrace sys_rawio sys_resources sys_tty_config syslog
# WARNING: the security vulnerability reported for 'cap_net_admin' at
# http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html
# via JIT spraying (the BPF JIT module disabled on most systems was used
# in the example, but others are suggested vulnerable) meant that users
# with root in a container, that capability and kernel module may escape
# the container. ALWAYS be extremely careful granting any process root
# within a container, use a minimal configuration at all levels -
# including the kernel - and multiple layers of security on any system
# where security is a priority. note that not only LXC but PAX (and
# others?) were vulnerable to this issue.
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