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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
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<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf8">
<title>Flawfinder Results</title>
<meta name="author" content="David A. Wheeler">
<meta name="keywords" lang="en" content="flawfinder results, security scan">
</head>
<body>
<h1>Flawfinder Results</h1>
Here are the security scan results from
<a href="http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder">Flawfinder version 1.31</a>,
(C) 2001-2014 <a href="http://www.dwheeler.com">David A. Wheeler</a>.
Number of rules (primarily dangerous function names) in C/C++ ruleset: 169
<p>
Examining test.c <br>
Examining test2.c <br>

<h2>Final Results</h2>
<ul>
<li>test.c:32: <b>  [5] </b> (buffer) <i> gets:
  Does not check for buffer overflows (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>, <a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html">CWE-20</a>). Use
  fgets() instead. </i>
<pre>
 gets(f);
</pre>
<li>test.c:56: <b>  [5] </b> (buffer) <i> strncat:
  Easily used incorrectly (e.g., incorrectly computing the correct maximum
  size to add) (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>).
  Consider strcat_s, strlcat, or automatically resizing strings. Risk is
  high; the length parameter appears to be a constant, instead of computing
  the number of characters left. </i>
<pre>
  strncat(d,s,sizeof(d)); /* Misuse - this should be flagged as riskier. */
</pre>
<li>test.c:57: <b>  [5] </b> (buffer) <i> _tcsncat:
  Easily used incorrectly (e.g., incorrectly computing the correct maximum
  size to add) (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>).
  Consider strcat_s, strlcat, or automatically resizing strings. Risk is
  high; the length parameter appears to be a constant, instead of computing
  the number of characters left. </i>
<pre>
  _tcsncat(d,s,sizeof(d)); /* Misuse - flag as riskier */
</pre>
<li>test.c:60: <b>  [5] </b> (buffer) <i> MultiByteToWideChar:
  Requires maximum length in CHARACTERS, not bytes (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Risk is
  high, it appears that the size is given as bytes, but the function requires
  size as characters. </i>
<pre>
  MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP,0,szName,-1,wszUserName,sizeof(wszUserName));
</pre>
<li>test.c:62: <b>  [5] </b> (buffer) <i> MultiByteToWideChar:
  Requires maximum length in CHARACTERS, not bytes (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Risk is
  high, it appears that the size is given as bytes, but the function requires
  size as characters. </i>
<pre>
  MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP,0,szName,-1,wszUserName,sizeof wszUserName);
</pre>
<li>test.c:73: <b>  [5] </b> (misc) <i> SetSecurityDescriptorDacl:
  Never create NULL ACLs; an attacker can set it to Everyone (Deny All
  Access), which would even forbid administrator access (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/732.html">CWE-732</a>). </i>
<pre>
  SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(&amp;sd,TRUE,NULL,FALSE);
</pre>
<li>test.c:73: <b>  [5] </b> (misc) <i> SetSecurityDescriptorDacl:
  Never create NULL ACLs; an attacker can set it to Everyone (Deny All
  Access), which would even forbid administrator access (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/732.html">CWE-732</a>). </i>
<pre>
  SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(&amp;sd,TRUE,NULL,FALSE);
</pre>
<li>test.c:17: <b>  [4] </b> (buffer) <i> strcpy:
  Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>).
  Consider using strcpy_s, strncpy, or strlcpy (warning, strncpy is easily
  misused). </i>
<pre>
 strcpy(b, a);
</pre>
<li>test.c:20: <b>  [4] </b> (buffer) <i> sprintf:
  Does not check for buffer overflows (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Use
  sprintf_s, snprintf, or vsnprintf. </i>
<pre>
 sprintf(s, "hello %s", bug);
</pre>
<li>test.c:21: <b>  [4] </b> (buffer) <i> sprintf:
  Does not check for buffer overflows (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Use
  sprintf_s, snprintf, or vsnprintf. </i>
<pre>
 sprintf(s, gettext("hello %s"), bug);
</pre>
<li>test.c:22: <b>  [4] </b> (format) <i> sprintf:
  Potential format string problem (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/134.html">CWE-134</a>). Make
  format string constant. </i>
<pre>
 sprintf(s, unknown, bug);
</pre>
<li>test.c:23: <b>  [4] </b> (format) <i> printf:
  If format strings can be influenced by an attacker, they can be exploited
  (<a href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/134.html">CWE-134</a>). Use
  a constant for the format specification. </i>
<pre>
 printf(bf, x);
</pre>
<li>test.c:25: <b>  [4] </b> (buffer) <i> scanf:
  The scanf() family's %s operation, without a limit specification, permits
  buffer overflows (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>, <a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html">CWE-20</a>). Specify a
  limit to %s, or use a different input function. </i>
<pre>
 scanf("%s", s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:27: <b>  [4] </b> (buffer) <i> scanf:
  The scanf() family's %s operation, without a limit specification, permits
  buffer overflows (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>, <a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html">CWE-20</a>). Specify a
  limit to %s, or use a different input function. </i>
<pre>
 scanf("%s", s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:38: <b>  [4] </b> (format) <i> syslog:
  If syslog's format strings can be influenced by an attacker, they can be
  exploited (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/134.html">CWE-134</a>). Use a
  constant format string for syslog. </i>
<pre>
 syslog(LOG_ERR, attacker_string);
</pre>
<li>test.c:49: <b>  [4] </b> (buffer) <i> _mbscpy:
  Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>).
  Consider using a function version that stops copying at the end of the
  buffer. </i>
<pre>
  _mbscpy(d,s); /* like strcpy, this doesn't check for buffer overflow */
</pre>
<li>test.c:52: <b>  [4] </b> (buffer) <i> lstrcat:
  Does not check for buffer overflows when concatenating to destination (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). </i>
<pre>
  lstrcat(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:75: <b>  [3] </b> (shell) <i> CreateProcess:
  This causes a new process to execute and is difficult to use safely (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html">CWE-78</a>). Specify
  the application path in the first argument, NOT as part of the second, or
  embedded spaces could allow an attacker to force a different program to
  run. </i>
<pre>
  CreateProcess(NULL, "C:\\Program Files\\GoodGuy\\GoodGuy.exe -x", "");
</pre>
<li>test.c:75: <b>  [3] </b> (shell) <i> CreateProcess:
  This causes a new process to execute and is difficult to use safely (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html">CWE-78</a>). Specify
  the application path in the first argument, NOT as part of the second, or
  embedded spaces could allow an attacker to force a different program to
  run. </i>
<pre>
  CreateProcess(NULL, "C:\\Program Files\\GoodGuy\\GoodGuy.exe -x", "");
</pre>
<li>test.c:91: <b>  [3] </b> (buffer) <i> getopt_long:
  Some older implementations do not protect against internal buffer overflows
  (<a href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>, <a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html">CWE-20</a>). Check
  implementation on installation, or limit the size of all string inputs. </i>
<pre>
    while ((optc = getopt_long (argc, argv, "a",longopts, NULL )) != EOF) {
</pre>
<li>test.c:16: <b>  [2] </b> (buffer) <i> strcpy:
  Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>).
  Consider using strcpy_s, strncpy, or strlcpy (warning, strncpy is easily
  misused). Risk is low because the source is a constant string. </i>
<pre>
 strcpy(a, gettext("Hello there")); // Did this work?
</pre>
<li>test.c:19: <b>  [2] </b> (buffer) <i> sprintf:
  Does not check for buffer overflows (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Use
  sprintf_s, snprintf, or vsnprintf. Risk is low because the source has a
  constant maximum length. </i>
<pre>
 sprintf(s, "hello");
</pre>
<li>test.c:45: <b>  [2] </b> (buffer) <i> char:
  Statically-sized arrays can be improperly restricted, leading to potential
  overflows or other issues (CWE-119:<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Perform
  bounds checking, use functions that limit length, or ensure that the size
  is larger than the maximum possible length. </i>
<pre>
  char d[20];
</pre>
<li>test.c:46: <b>  [2] </b> (buffer) <i> char:
  Statically-sized arrays can be improperly restricted, leading to potential
  overflows or other issues (CWE-119:<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Perform
  bounds checking, use functions that limit length, or ensure that the size
  is larger than the maximum possible length. </i>
<pre>
  char s[20];
</pre>
<li>test.c:50: <b>  [2] </b> (buffer) <i> memcpy:
  Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Make
  sure destination can always hold the source data. </i>
<pre>
  memcpy(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:51: <b>  [2] </b> (buffer) <i> CopyMemory:
  Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Make
  sure destination can always hold the source data. </i>
<pre>
  CopyMemory(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:97: <b>  [2] </b> (misc) <i> fopen:
  Check when opening files - can an attacker redirect it (via symlinks),
  force the opening of special file type (e.g., device files), move things
  around to create a race condition, control its ancestors, or change its
  contents? (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html">CWE-362</a>). </i>
<pre>
  f = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r"); 
</pre>
<li>test.c:15: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> strcpy:
  Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>).
  Consider using strcpy_s, strncpy, or strlcpy (warning, strncpy is easily
  misused). Risk is low because the source is a constant character. </i>
<pre>
 strcpy(a, "\n"); // Did this work?
</pre>
<li>test.c:18: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> sprintf:
  Does not check for buffer overflows (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Use
  sprintf_s, snprintf, or vsnprintf. Risk is low because the source is a
  constant character. </i>
<pre>
 sprintf(s, "\n");
</pre>
<li>test.c:26: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> scanf:
  It's unclear if the %s limit in the format string is small enough (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Check
  that the limit is sufficiently small, or use a different input function. </i>
<pre>
 scanf("%10s", s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:53: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> strncpy:
  Easily used incorrectly; doesn't always \0-terminate or check for invalid
  pointers (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). </i>
<pre>
  strncpy(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:54: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> _tcsncpy:
  Easily used incorrectly; doesn't always \0-terminate or check for invalid
  pointers (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). </i>
<pre>
  _tcsncpy(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:55: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> strncat:
  Easily used incorrectly (e.g., incorrectly computing the correct maximum
  size to add) (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>).
  Consider strcat_s, strlcat, or automatically resizing strings. </i>
<pre>
  strncat(d,s,10);
</pre>
<li>test.c:58: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> strlen:
  Does not handle strings that are not \0-terminated; if given one it may
  perform an over-read (it could cause a crash if unprotected) (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/126.html">CWE-126</a>). </i>
<pre>
  n = strlen(d);
</pre>
<li>test.c:64: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> MultiByteToWideChar:
  Requires maximum length in CHARACTERS, not bytes (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Risk is
  very low, the length appears to be in characters not bytes. </i>
<pre>
  MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP,0,szName,-1,wszUserName,sizeof(wszUserName)/sizeof(wszUserName[0]));
</pre>
<li>test.c:66: <b>  [1] </b> (buffer) <i> MultiByteToWideChar:
  Requires maximum length in CHARACTERS, not bytes (<a
  href="http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html">CWE-120</a>). Risk is
  very low, the length appears to be in characters not bytes. </i>
<pre>
  MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP,0,szName,-1,wszUserName,sizeof wszUserName /sizeof(wszUserName[0]));
</pre>
</ul>
<h2>Analysis Summary</h2>
<p>
Hits = 36
<br>
Lines analyzed = 118
<br>
Physical Source Lines of Code (SLOC) = 80
<br>
Hits@level = [0]   0 [1]   9 [2]   7 [3]   3 [4]  10 [5]   7 <br>
Hits@level+ = [0+]  36 [1+]  36 [2+]  27 [3+]  20 [4+]  17 [5+]   7 <br>
Hits/KSLOC@level+ = [0+] 450 [1+] 450 [2+] 337.5 [3+] 250 [4+] 212.5 [5+] 87.5 <br>
Suppressed hits = 2 (use --neverignore to show them)
<br>
Minimum risk level = 1
<br>
Not every hit is necessarily a security vulnerability.
<br>
There may be other security vulnerabilities; review your code!
<br>
See '<a href="http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs">Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO</a>'
(<a href="http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs">http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs</a>) for more information.
</body>
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